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CHILDREN ARE LOSING MARYLAND'S "TENDER YEARS"
WAR
Lynn McLaint

Often times, the child is the only witness. Yet age may make
the child incompetent to testify in court .... "[W] hen the
choice is between evidence which is less than best and no
evidence at all, only clear folly would dictate an across-theboard policy of doing without.'"
I.

INTRODUCTION

What seems like Maryland's version of the Hundred Years War
continues to be fought in the Maryland General Assembly regarding
the "tender years exception," a limited hearsay exception for statements made by children under twelve years old regarding physical
or sexual abuse against them. 2 Maryland's statute is much more re-
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children.
1. Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 943 (4th Cir. 1988) (quoting FED. R EVID.
art. VIII advisory committee's note).
2. Maryland's tender years statute, MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 775 (Supp. 1997),
amended Uy S. 688 (Md. 1998) (effective October 1, 1998), is reprinted in the
Appendix to this Article. The amendments are clearly noted. Senate Bill 688 is
also available in <http://mlis.state.md.us/1998rs/billfile/HB0590.htm> (visited
April 20, 1998).
Section 775 establishes a limited tender years exception for certain out-ofcourt statements made by victims of alleged child abuse that have been
screened by the trial judge and found to be sufficiently reliable to be admissible in evidence. Some prosecutors have complained that some trial judges will
not admit even very reliable hearsay under Section 775. See Letter from Rob-
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strictive than those of other states. 3 Yet, year after year, attempts to
liberalize it have been defeated in the Maryland House of Delegates
Judiciary Committee, leaving Maryland's children significantly less
protected from physical and sexual abuse than children living III
other states.
Prior to the adoption of the current tender years statute, in
Deloso v. State,4 a five-year-old Maryland girl was repeatedly beaten. s
Her father's conviction for child abuse was reversed on appeal because the trial judge admitted testimony that a young girl had told
teachers and others that her father beat her and threw her against
the wal1. 6 If the child had run for help and was excited when she
made the statement, it would have been admissible under the traditional hearsay exception for excited utterances. 7 However, the tradi-

3.

4.
5.
6.
7.

ert L. Dean, State's Attorney for Montgomery County, to Sandra F. Haines, Reporter, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 1 (Nov. 17,
1997) (on file with author). If tender years hearsay is deemed essential to a
prosecution, and the judge erroneously excludes it, the State has no recourse.
See generally Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 12-302 (1995) (denying a right
to appeal of a final judgment unless expressly granted by law). Allowing interlocutory appeals by the State from adverse pretrial evidentiary rulings would
do much to ameliorate this situation-at least if the trial judge rules (or is required to rule) before trial. See generally, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-979(c)
(1997); ORE. REv. STAT. 138.060(3) (1995).
See ALA. CODE § 15-25-32 (1995); ALAsKA STAT. § 12.40.110 (Michie 1995); ARIz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (West 1989); ARK. R EVID. 803(25); CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 1228 (West 1995); COLO. R EVID. § 13-25-129 (Supp. 1997); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 3513(a) (1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-16 (1995); HAW. R EVID.
804 (b) (6); IDAHO CODE § 19-3024 (1997); 725 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/115-10
(West 1986 & Supp. 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-3746 (West Supp. 1994); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 232.96 (West 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60460(dd) (Supp. 1997);
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-103.1 (1995); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
233, § 81 (West Supp. 1997); MICH. R EVID. 803A; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02
(West 1996); MISS. R EVID. 803(25); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.075 (West 1996);
NEV. REv. STAT. § 51.385 (1996); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 516:25-a (Supp. 1995);
NJ. R EVID. 803(27); NY FAM. CT. Acr § 1046 (McKinney 1983); N.D. R EVID.
803(24); OHIO R EVID. 807; OKrA STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2803.1 (West 1993 &
Supp. 1998); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5985.1 (West Supp. 1997); RI. GEN.
LAws § 14-1-69 (1994); S.c. CODE ANN. § 19-1-180 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1996);
S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 19-16-38 (Michie 1995); TEx. CRIM. P. CODE ANN. § 38.072
(West Supp. 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5411 (1995); VT. R EVID. 804a(a);
VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.13:2 (Michie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.44.120 (West 1988 & Supp. 1998).
37 Md. App. 101, 376 A.2d 873 (1977).
See id. at 102·03, 376 A.2d at 875.
See id. at 107, 376 A.2d at 877.
See generally MD. RULE 5-803 (b) (2) (providing an excited utterance exception
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tional common-law hearsay exceptions did not permit the trial
judge to admit the statement, because the child's statement was
quite casual. 8 Even if the judge found that the statement was extremely reliable, it would remain inadmissible under the common
law. 9 Maryland's subsequently adopted tender years exception would
permit a judge to admit this type of statement, if found reliable, but
only if made to a teacher, a licensed physician, a licensed psychologist, or a licensed social worker.lO A 1998 amendment, effective October 1, 1998, repeals the "licensed" requirement and extends the
list of professionals to include nurses, principals, vice principals,
and school counselors. II
Despite legislative efforts embodied in Section 775 of Article 27,
Maryland's children continue to lack adequate protection. Under
current law, for example, another act of injustice occurred in a case
involving a five-year-old Maryland girl who contracted gonorrhea. 12
Her stepfather was tried and acquitted when the State was not permitted to prove that the child had described her stepfather having
sexual intercourse with her.13 The child made the statement to a police officer and not directly to a licensed physician, licensed psychologist, licensed social worker, or a teacher. Therefore, the statement
could not be reviewed for reliability by the trial judge. 14 It was ruled
inadmissible per se under Maryland's limited tender years exception.IS If the same statement had been made to a teacher, licensed
to the rule against hearsay).
8. See Deloso, 37 Md. App. at 107, 376 A.2d at 877.
9. See id.
10. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 775 (Supp. 1997) (amended 1998). Section 775,
with amendments that become effective October 1, 1998, is reprinted in the
Appendix to this Article.
11. See H.D. 590, sec. 1, § 775(b)(2)(i) (Md. 1988) (effective October 1, 1998),
available in <http://mlis.state.md.us/1998rs/billfile/HB0590.htm> (visited
April 20, 1998). Section 775, with amendments, is reprinted in the Appendix
to this Article.
The term "school counselor" is defined as a "school counselor at a public
or private preschool, elementary school, or secondary school." H.D. 590, sec.
1, § 775(b) (2) (i) (5).
12. See Jackie Powder, Judge's Ban of Social Worker's Testimony in Child Abuse Case Upsets Investigators, THE SUN (BALT.), August 9, 1992, at 6B.
13. See id.
14. See id. See generally § 775. The 1998 amendments, which extended this list and
eliminated the "licensed" requirement, see H.D. 590, sec. 1, § 775(b)(2)(i),
would not remedy this injustice. Section 775, with amendments, is reprinted
in the Appendix to this Article.
15. See Powder, supra note 12, at 6B.
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physician, psychologist, or social worker in a related civil proceeding for a protective order (or custody suit brought by the biological
father), it would remain inadmissible under current Maryland law
because the tender years exception applies only in criminal and juvenile cases. 16
Repeated efforts to mainstream Maryland's tender years hearsay
exception to parallel those of other states have been received with
hostility bordering on hysteria. Excuses often cited for opposing
main streaming include the following: (1) fears that many innocent
people will be wrongly convicted of child abuse because "children
lie," and (2) that wives will make false accusations against their children's fathers in an effort to gain the upper hand in divorce casesY
The hostility stems in part from the self-interests of both the Maryland State Teacher's Association (MSTA)-whose members do not
want to be accused of child abuse-and the criminal defense barwhose members do not want their clients to be convicted-as well
as from simple gender bias against women.
The recurring arguments against mainstreaming Maryland's
tender years exception are illogical. They are contemptuous of and
degrading to women and children, and they are distrustful and disrespectful of both trial judges' ability to screen out unreliable hearsay and jurors' ability to assess the credibility of hearsay that is properly admitted into evidence. 18 The opponents of liberalizing
Maryland's tender years statute have provided no support for their
views, either under case law or with empirical data.
To the extent that these antagonistic views are based on reasonable fears of false accusations, they are clearly aimed at the wrong
target. Rules of evidence cannot prevent false or erroneous accusations. Malicious accusations of child abuse, like malicious accusations of any criminal wrongdoing, are actionable as slander, libel, or
malicious prosecution. 19
This Article first discusses the rationale for the tender years
hearsay exception 20 and the constitutional limits on admitting
16. See § 775(b)(I); see also supra note 11 and accompanying text (noting that a
1998 amendment repealed the "licensed" requirement and added four more
professionals to the list).
17. See infra Part V.A-C.
18. In the case of a bench trial, the judge's ability to decide the credibility of the
hearsay is also questioned.
19. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 150-51, 435 (1996 & Supp. 1997); Krashes v.
White, 275 Md. 549, 554, 341 A.2d 798, 801 (1975).
20. See infra notes 2~111 and accompanying text.
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tender years hearsay.21 Next, it sets forth the history of Maryland's
tender years statute. 22 This Article then addresses each of the arguments that have been made over the years by opponents of liberalizing the statute 23 and compares Maryland's tender years statute to
those of other states. 24 Finally, this Article recommends specific
amendments to Maryland's tender years statute and proposes its incorporation into the Maryland Rules of Evidence. 25

II. THE NEED FOR A TENDER YEARS HEARSAY EXCEPTION
The vast majority of states have created tender years hearsay exceptions, either by statute or through specific rules of evidence. 26
Several public policy reasons support the recognition of the tender
years exception: (1) child abuse- physical, sexual, and emotionalis a serious, widespread problem in the United States;27 (2) young
children are particularly helpless, and they are unable to extricate
themselves from seriously abusive homes or other environments
without adult assistance; (3) effective remedial action cannot be
taken without identifying the abuser, who is usually known only to
the child and, sometimes, to someone who colludes with or covers
up for the abuser;28 (4) for reasons explained by developmental psychology, very young children are often ruled incompetent to testify
at trial, although they may have made reliable, concrete out-of-court
statements at an earlier time;29 (5) even if permitted to testify at
trial, young children are unlikely to be able to testify to an earlier
event with the degree of memory that an adult could, and they are
easily confused by a deft cross-examination;3o and (6) pre-existing,
See infra notes 112-166 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 169-245 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 254-97 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 298-349 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 351-401, 402 and accompanying text.
See generally sources cited supra note 3.
See Successful Suits Don't Always Improve States' Care of Abused Children, THE SUN
(BALT.), Mar. 17, 1996, at 18A. See generally BILUE WRIGHT DZIECH & JUDGE
CHARLES B. SCHUDSON, ON TRIAL, AMERICA'S COURTS AND THEIR TREATMENT OF
SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILDREN (2d ed. 1991).
28. See, e.g., Mary Maushard, More Charges Possible in Death of 9-Year-Old, THE SUN
(BALT.), July 13, 1997, at 2B (describing the household of a child abuse victim
that was likely to have had one actual abuser and two colluding adults).
29. See 1 JOHN E.B. MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT CAsES §§ 3.1-3.8
(3d ed. 1997).
30. See id. §§ 1.2, 1.3-1.7, 1.29. See generally id. §§ 6.1-6.22 (providing a comprehensive explanation of children as witnesses).
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

26

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 27

"firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions have been inadequate to permit
the admission of all reliable out-of-court statements made by
children. 31

A.

Serious Child Abuse and Neglect are Widespread

As the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized,
"[ilt is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State's interest in 'safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a
minor' is 'compelling.' "32 The states, however, are having serious
difficulty protecting children. 33 As of March 1996, at least twenty-one
states were under court supervision as a result of having failed to
provide proper care for abused or neglected children. 34 Physical
abuse and sexual abuse are both widespread. A news article from
March 1996 reported: "Surveys by the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services show the annual number of abused or neglected children has more than doubled in the past decade, to 2.9
million from 1.4 million. The number seriously injured by
abuse . . . has quadrupled, to 572,000 from 143,000."35
A federal advisory panel concluded, after a two-and-one-halfyear study, that the "vast m~ority of [physically] abused and neglected children are under four years old. "36 At least two thousand
children are killed by abuse and neglect each year in the United
States, "outstripping deaths caused by accidental falls, choking on
food, suffocation, drowning or residential fires."37
In late 1995, a Gallup poll asked parents to report on their own
disciplinary acts of physical abuse and their knowledge of any sexual
31. See infra Part IlLB.1.
32. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109 (1990) (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747, 756-58 (1982) (citations omitted»; accord Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S.
836, 852 (1990) (recognizing that "a state's interest in 'the protection of minor victims of sex crimes from further trauma and embarrassment' is a 'compelling' one").
33. See Successful Suits Don't Always Improve States' Care of Alntsed Children, THE SUN
(BALT.), Mar. 17, 1996, at 18A.
34. See id.
35. Id.; see also Andrea J. Sedlak, Ph.D. & Diane D. Broadhurst, M.L.A., Executive
Summary of U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THIRD NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (1996). Even intentional starvation
has occurred. See Cheryl Lu-Lien Tan, Principal Recalls Bruises on Child, THE
SUN (BALT.), July 14, 1997, at lB.
36. Child Alntse Has Reached Crisis Proportions in U.S., Advisory Board Finds, THE SUN
(BALT.), Apr. 26, 1995, at 24A.
'
37. Id.

1997]

"Tender Years" War

27

abuse inflicted upon their children. 38 Physical abuse was defined as
including punching, kicking, throwing the child down, and hitting
the child with a hard object somewhere other than on the buttocks. 39 This definition was limited so as to not include spanking,
slapping, shouting, cursing, or threatening to send the child away.40
Based on those results, the Gallup organization estimated that more
than three million American children are physically abused annually.41 Generally, more mothers than fathers reported physically
abusing their children. 42 The Gallup poll also suggested that 1.3 million American children are sexually abused. 43
In 1996, Maryland had 29,778 reported cases of child abuse. 44
Prince George's County accounted for 3,043 of those cases; of that
number, 546 cases involved sexual abuse. 45 In Baltimore City, there
were 8,441 reported cases of abuse, including 824 investigations of
sexual abuse.46
Abuse of children occurs most often in the fcimily home. 47 The
facts of various Maryland appellate cases, for example, describe a
range of abuse-at-home scenarios, including a three-and-one-halfyear-old child's lacerated internal organs, extensive bruising, and internal bleeding. 48 Because child abuse is such an unpleasant topic,
38. See 2 Suroeys Find Grim News for Children, THE SUN (BALT.). Dec. 7, 1995, at 4A.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See REpORT OF MARYLAND'S CHILD PROTECITVE SERVICES (1996) (report on file
with author).
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See United States v. Babe, 128 F.3d 1440, 1446 (10th Cir. 1997); Veronica Serrato, Note, Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A Spectrum of Uses,
68 B.U. L. REv. 155, 158 (1988).
48. See Moore v. State, 26 Md. App. 556, 557-59, 338 A.2d 344, 345-46 (1975)
(holding that a three-and-one-half-year-old child's statement in an emergency
room that "Daddy [stepfather or mother's boyfriend] did it," made within
hours after infliction of injuries, was properly admitted as an excited utterance); see also Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1, 6-7, 50, 536 A.2d 666, 668-69,
690 (1988) (finding that it was reversible error to admit a two-and-one-halfyear-old child's responses, "Daddy [her mother's boyfriend]" did it, when
asked by a physician examining extensive bruising on her arms, legs, and buttocks, and irritation to her genital area, "Who did this?" because they were
neither excited utterances nor was it known whether the child believed she
was making statements to assist in her medical treatment); In re Rachel T., 77
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people naturally tend to employ the defense mechanism of denial
and think that it does not happen. However, studies show otherwise. "Most abusers reside in the child's home, most frequently the
father (14%), stepfather (12%), boyfriend of the mother (13 %), or
other relative (older brother, uncle, grandfather) (14%)."49
When sexual abuse occurs, a young child may not know, or
may know only on some intuitive level, that what is happening is
wrong and uncomfortable. In either case, the child may feel unsure
and hesitant about breaking a promise to the abuser by telling the
"secret," or may be intimidated into remaining silent by the
abuser's threats. 50 An older child who knows that the sexual activity
should not be happening may have guilty feelings mixed with fear.
As a result, the child is likely either not to report or to delay repoiting the abuse. 51
The clues to detecting abuse in children of any age are abnormal behavior on the part of the child, including "acting out, "52 engaging in precocious sexual activity,53 or withdrawing from a normal
touch, such as a pat on the shoulder by a babysitter or a teacher. 54
In some cases, there may be physical evidence of abuse that a caretaker might notice (for example, at bath time).55 However, the physical evidence of abuse might not be discovered until a medical examination is performed. 56 Additionally, sexually abused children are

49.

50.
51.

52.
53.
54.

55.
56.

Md. App. 20, 34-37, 549 A.2d 27, 34-36 (1988) (finding that a four-and-onehalf-year-old child's statements to a social worker, who was member of a pediatric gynecology specialist's treatment team, when the child had been bleeding from her vagina and rectum and knew that her statements would be used
to provide treatment, were properly admitted in a Child in Need of Assistance
(CINA) hearing under the hearsay exception for statements made for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment; the child said that she had a "secret
with her Dad" and that her father said "she was going to cry a lot if she told";
the child depicted intercourse between a girl doll and a "Daddy" doll, calling
the doll's penis a "tutor").
Theodore P. Cross et aI., Criminal Justice Outcomes of Prosecution of Child Sexual
Abuse: A Case Flow Analysis, 19 CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 1432, 144142 (1995).
See Serrato, supra note 47, at 157-61.
See id. at 158-61; Ann Marie Hagen, Note, Tolling the Statute of Limitations for
Adult Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse, 76 IOWA L. REv. 355, 359 & n.30
(1991).
See MYERS, supra note 29, § 5.3, at 421.
See id. at § 5.3, at 422-23; see also, e.g., Doe v. United States, 976 F.2d 1071, 1086
(7th Cir. 1992).
See MYERS, supra note 29, § 5.3, at 422.
See id. § 4.5.
See id.

o
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often aware of bodily functions they should not be aware of and use
inappropriate language when describing their experiences. 57
Child abuse exacts a high price on our children and our society in many ways. 58 The long term effects on maltreated children include "delinquency, pregnancy, alcohol and drug abuse, school failure, and emotional and mental health problems."59
B.

Difficulty in Identifying the Abuser

"Child abuse is one of the most difficult crimes to detect and
prosecute, in large part because there are often no witnesses except
for the victim."60 The child's out-of-court statement is often essential
to identifying the abuser. Without convincing proof of who committed the abuse, the State is helpless to protect the child and prosecute the child's abuser.61 Unless either the abused child or the
abuser is removed, the abuse may continue with impunity. The theory behind the tender years hearsay exception is that young children's out-of-court statements regarding child abuse that contain
sufficient indicia of reliability ought to be admitted into evidence
and considered by the fact finder, even if they do not fall within the
firmly rooted, common-law hearsay exceptions. 62
C.

Inadequacy of Other Hearsay Exceptions

The firmly rooted, common-law hearsay exceptions that were
recognized in Maryland when the first tender years statute was
adopted in 1988, and the additional exceptions codified in the Maryland Rules of Evidence, effective July 1, 1994, are inadequate to address the problem that the tender years exception was intended to
combat. 63

57. See id. § 1.17.
58. See, e.g., id. § 4.1, at 294-96, §§ 5.2-5.3, at 413-17.
59. Barbara Tatem Kelley et ai., In the Wake of Childhood Maltreatment, JUV. JUST.
BULL., Aug. 1997, at 2; see also, SexuaUy Abused Teen-Agers Face Tougher Road, THE
SUN (BALT.), Oct. 1, 1997, at 5A; Youth Offenders Sent Away, Only to Return, THE
SUN (BALT.). Sept. 29, 1997, at 1A.
60. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987) (plurality opinion).
61. See Powder, supra note 12, at 6B.
62. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 775 (Supp. 1997) (amended 1998). Section 775 is
reprinted in the Appendix to this Article.
63. See infra notes 64-94 and accompanying text.
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1. The Common-Law Hearsay Exceptions Now Codified in the Maryland Rules of Evidence

The following four common-law hearsay exceptions are codified
in the Maryland Rules of Evidence..

a.

Statements Made in Order to Obtain Medical Treatment

A patient's out-of-court statements to a treating physician (or
another person from whom one seeks medical treatment) are admissible in evidence to the extent that they relate to facts relevant
to treatment, regardless whether the patient is available to testify.64
The out-of-court statements are admissible whether or not the patien t testifies at the trial. 65
The circumstantial guarantee of reliability is found in the patient's self-interest in obtaining proper treatment. 66 This self-interest
is thought to override any motive for insincerity.67 If a child, seeking
treatment, complains to a doctor or nurse that he has been injured
in a particular way by a particular person, the doctor may testify at
trial to the physical ac.ts described by the child. 68 The child need
not be found competent to testify at trial. 69
However, Maryland case law is unsettled regarding whether the
doctor may testify to the child's identification of the assailant. 70 The
64. See MD. RULE 5-803 (b) (4); JOSEPH F. MuRPHY, JR, MARYLAND EVIDENCE HANDBOOK § 803(E) (2) (2d ed. 1993); see also, e.g., Shirks Motor Express v. Oxenham, 204 Md. 626, 635-36, 106 A.2d 46, 49-50 (1954).
65. See MD. RULE 5-803(b)(4).
66. See Yellow Cab Co. v. Henderson, 183 Md. 546, 551-54, 39 A.2d 546, 550-51
(1944) (admitting a statement where the declarant was the mother of the
three-year-old patient). Thus, "[ t] he Maryland cases recognize that there is an
equal circumstantial guarantee of sincerity when one seeks treatment for oneself or for a loved one." LYNN MCLAIN, MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE 255
(1994); see, e.g., Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1, 29-30, 536 A.2d 666, 675
(1988) (finding the sincerity motive to be lacking).
67. See supra note 66.
68. See FED. R EVID. 803(4). The advisory committee note provides: "Under the
exception the statement need not have been made to a physician. Statements
to hospital attendants, ambulance drivers, or even members of the family
might be included." Id. advisory committee's note, at n.4.
69. See infra notes 120-64 and accompanying text.
70. Compare Cassidy, 74 Md. App. at 30, 536 A.2d at 680 (stating that the identity
of the person who inflicted the bruises is not ordinarily of medical importance), with In re Rachel T., 77 Md. App. 20, 36, 549 A.2d 27, 35 (1988) (stating that the child's statements implicating her father as her abuser were admissible under the treating physician exception). See generally 6 LYNN McLAIN,
MARYLAND EVIDENCE: STATE AND FEDERAL § 803.1 (4) & nn.4-6 (1987 & Supp.
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disagreement centers around the relevance of the child's identification of the assailant to the medical treatment. 71 Courts in some
other jurisdictions have admitted the child's identification of the
abuser as relevant to the physician's proposed course of treatment,
particularly when the alleged abuser lives with the child.72 Maryland's current tender years exception would allow such statements if
found to be reliable, but only if made to a physician, psychologist,
nurse, social worker, teacher, principal, vice principal, or school
counselor.73

b.

Excited Utterances

A child's out-of-court statement will be admissible as an excited
utterance if it was made spontaneously while the child remained
under continuing stress from a startling event, regardless whether
the child is available to testify.74 It does not matter whether the
child testifies or whether the child is available to testify.75 Additionally, the child does not have to be competent to testify at trial in order for the statement to be admitted. 76
The theory of the reliability of an excited utterance is that the
continuing stress of the event stills the declarant's ability to fabricate.?7 If, for example, a child escaped from his attacker and ran to
a police officer on the corner and blurted out what had happened,
the police officer could testify to the child's statement.?8

71.
72.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

78.

1995). For federal cases, see id. § 803.2(4) & n.6. See also Moore v. State, 26
Md. App. 556, 559-67, 338 A.2d 344, 345-50 (1975) (admitting an out-of-court
statement by a three-and-one-half-year-old child to a physician, made within
hours after the alleged beating, that "Daddy was mad, Daddy did it," but admitting it under the hearsay exception for excited utterances).
See supra note 70.
See, e.g., United States v. DeNoyer, 811 F.2d 436, 438 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding
statements that a five-year-old boy, who testified at trial, had made to social
workers were properly admitted under both FED. R EvlD. 803(4) and FED. R
EVID. 803(24»; State v. Smith, 337 S.E.2d 833, 83940 (N.C. 1985) (finding
four- and five-year-old girls' statements to their grandmother, resulting in
their getting subsequent medical treatment, were properly admitted under the
medical treatment exception).
See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 775 (Supp. 1997) (amended 1998). Section 775,
with amendments, is reprinted in the Appendix to this Article.
See MD. RULE 5-803 (b) (2); see also MuRPHY. supra note 64, § 803(C).
See, e.g., Moore, 26 Md. App. at 562, 338 A.2d at 347.
See infra notes 120-64 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Mouzone v. State, 294 Md. 692, 697, 452 A.2d 661, 664 (1982).
See Sears v. State, 9 Md. App. 375, 383-84, 264 A.2d 485, 488-89 (1970) (finding
a police officer's testimony to statements within one-half hour of assault, made
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This exception, however, does not apply when a child's reports
of abuse are not spontaneous, but instead are in response to questioning. 79 An excited utterance must be made while the child is
under such continuing stress as to preclude his conscious thinking
and functioning. 80 However, in many cases the child may have been
intimidated by his abuser not to tell anyone, may feel guilty about
revealing the identity of the abuser, or may repress the experience. 81 For these reasons, the child may not tell anyone until someone notices a change in the child's physical condition or behavior
and questions the child about it, or until the threat of repeated
abuse is imminent. 82 In these situations, the child's statement regarding the earlier abuse will not quality as an excited utterance. 83
For example, in Harnish v. State,84 the mother of the alleged
child abuse victim testified that when the defendant, a neighbor,
came over to the child's house and asked the mother to allow the
five-year-old child to visit him, the child told her about sexual abuse
by the neighbor that had occurred eleven days earlier.85 The neighbor's conviction was reversed by the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland on the ground that the child's statement to his mother was
inadmissible as an excited utterance. 86 Even under Maryland's current tender years exception, the mother would be unable to testifY
to her child's statement. This case demonstrates that Maryland cannot fulfill its compelling interest in protecting children under the
present state of the law.87

79.
80.
81.

82.
83.

84.
85.
86.
87.

by an eleven-year-old victim after she fled to the police station, was properly
admitted); see also Smith v. State, 6 Md. App. 581, 588, 252 A.2d 277, 281
(1969) (finding a four-year-old girl's out-of-court statement to her mother,
four to five hours after rape, but her first words spoken during that time, was
properly admitted).
See, e.g., Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 826 (1990); Cassidy v. State, 74 Md.
App. 1, 22, 536 A.2d 666, 676 (1988).
See MD. RULE 5-803 (b) (2); Mouzone, 294 Md. at 697, 452 A.2d at 664.
See Judy \Un, Note, A Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements in Sex
Almse Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1745, 1756-57 (1983); Darren J. LaMarca, Note,
Evidence - Sexual Almse of Children: The justification for a New Hearsay Exception,
5 MISS. C. L. REv. 177, 180 (1985).
See \Un, supra note 81, at 180; supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
See Deloso v. State, 37 Md. App. 101, 102·-07, 376 A.2d 873, 875-77 (1977) (finding it reversible error to admit proof of a five-year-old girl's "quite casual"
complaints of beatings by her father).
9 Md. App. 546,266 A.2d 364 (1970).
See id. at 548, 266 A.2d at 364.
See id. at 551-52, 266 A.2d at 366-67.
See generally Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109 (1990).
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Prompt Reports of Sexual Assault

Maryland recognizes a hearsay exception for a victim's prompt
report of rape or other sexual assault. 88 The report is admissible to
corroborate the victim's testimony as long as the victim is present at
trial and available for cross-examination. 89 For a variety of reasons,
however, children often may not make prompt reports. 90 Moreover,
a very young victim frequently is not available for cross-examination
at trial because the judge has found the child incompetent to testify.91 In either event, this hearsay exception would be inapplicable
and highlights the need for a tender years exception that more fully
protects children.
d.

Dying Declarations

The statement of a fourteen-year-old girl, as she threw herself
in front of a train, shouting that "she was taking her life because of
anguish over early morning sexual assaults by her father," was admitted as evidence in a Virginia trial of the girl's father for aggravated sexual battery.92 Under Maryland's common-law hearsay excep88. See MD. RULE 5-802.1 (d); see also MuRPHY, supra note 64, § 801(D).
89. See, e.g., State v. Werner, 302 Md. 550, 563, 489 A.2d 1119, 1125-26 (1985).
90. See, e.g., Harnish, 9 Md. App. at 551, 266 A.2d at366 (stating that the child dis-closed the incident of abuse to his mother eleven days after it happened); see
also Cole v. State, 83 Md. App. 279, 302, 305, 574 A.2d 326, 337, 339 (1990)
(finding it reversible error to admit, in the State's rebuttal, evidence of a tenyear-old victim's complaints to her babysitter and to a police officer that did
not qualify under the common-law exceptions as either timely complaints of
sexual attack or as prior consistent statements admissible to rehabilitate the
witness's credibility; nor did the statements qualify under MD. CODE ANN., Crs.
& JUD. PROC. § 9-103.1 (Supp. 1989) (current version at MD. ANN. CODE, art.
27, § 775 (Supp. 1997) (amended 1998», because they were not made to a licensed physician, a licensed psychologist, a licensed social worker, or a
teacher).
91. For example, a child sexual abuse prosecution against Jamal Craig, the teenage son of the operator of the Craig Country Preschool in Howard County,
Maryland, was dismissed in the summer of 1987 when the trial judge found
the seven-year-old alleged victim incompetent to testify because she had no
memory at the time of trial of the alleged abuse. See Michael J. Clark, Craig
Witness Said to Identify Other Abusers, THE SUN (BALT.), Aug. 25, 1987, at 2D;
Michael J. Clark, Howard Prosecutors Drop One Abuse Case Against Craig Youth;
Other Cases Remain, THE SUN (BALT.), July 29, 1987, at ID.
92. John F. Harris, Father Guilty of Molesting Va. Teen-Ager, THE WASH. POST, Oct. 17,
1986, at C1. Either the dying declaration exception or the excited utterance
exception may have been the avenue by which the trial court admitted that
statement. See generally Hall v. Commonwealth, 403 S.E.2d 362, 366 (Va. 1991)

34

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 27

tion for dying declarations, a child victim's statement describing a
life-threatening attack and identifYing the attacker would be admissible if the child made the statement under the belief that death was
imminent.93 This exception, however, is available only if the child is
unavailable to testify, and it is limited to civil cases and to criminal
cases of homicide, attempted homicide, and assault with intent to
commit homicide. 94 Therefore, the statements made by the sexually
abused daughter in the Virginia case would be inadmissible in Maryland under the dying declarations hearsay exception. 95
These four firmly rooted, common-law hearsay exceptions are
inadequate to provide the blanket protection that the proposed
tender years exception affords. Although there are alternative avenues to pursue when attempting to admit hearsay statements, the
explanations below demonstrate that they are equally inadequate.
2.

Other Exceptions Codified in the Maryland Rules of Evidence

The following four additional hearsay exceptions, codified in
the Maryland Rules of Evidence, could apply to some out-of-court
statements made by abused children.

a. If the Child Testifies at Trial and is Subject to Cross-Examination Concerning the Statement
Under Maryland Rule 5-802.1, if a young child testifies at trial
and is subject to cross-examination concerning his out-of-court statements, the child's out-of-court statements could be admissible as
substantive evidence if they fall within one of the following three
categories: 96 (1) prior inconsistent statements of a recanting witness,97 but only if the statements were recorded electronically; or
were made at a grand jury proceeding, deposition, or other trial; or
are in writing and signed by the child;98 (2) prior statements consistent with the child's trial testimony, if the child has been impeached by the suggestion of improper influence, motive, or
fabrication, but only if the prior statements predate the suggested

93.
94.

95.
96.
97.
98.

(dying declaration); Braxton v. Commonwealth, 493 S.E.2d 688, 691 (Va. 1997)
(excited utterance).
See MD. RULE 5-804 (b) (2); MuRPHY. supra note 64, § 802(C).
See MD. RULE 5-804 (b) (2).
See id.
See MCLAIN. SUPRA note 66, § 2.802.1 (4) (a).
See Serrato, supra note 47, at 162 (discussing reasons why child witnesses recant their allegations of abuse).
See MD. RULE 5-802.1 (a); McLAIN, supra note 66, at 414-15.
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improper motive or alleged fabrication;99 and (3) a prior identification of a person after perceiving the person (for example, in a lineUp).100

.b.

The Residual Exceptions

In addition to the above three exceptions, if the child is unavailable to testify at the trial, Maryland Rule 5-804 (b) (5) recognizes
a "catch-all," residual hearsay exception. 101 However, the residual
hearsay exception will only apply "[ ul nder exceptional circumstances" when the statements involved have "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness,"I02 equivalent to the specific hearsay exceptions in· Maryland Rule 5-804 (b) .103 Maryland Rule 5-803 (b) (24)
similarly provides a residual exception for sufficiently reliable hearsay, whether or not the child is available to testify.l04
A number of other state I05 and federal courts lO6 have relied on
99. See MD. RULE 5-802.1(b); see also Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 167
(1995) (holding that the statements of the alleged child abuse victim were
inadmissible) .
100. See MD. RULE 5-802.1 (c); MCLAIN, supra note 66, § 2.802.1(4) (e).
101. See MD. RULE 5-804(b) (5).
102. Id.
103. See MD. RULE 5-804(b).
104. See MD. RULE 5-803 (b) (24).
105. See, e.g., Bertrang v. State, 184 N.W.2d 867, 870 (Wis. 1971) (holding that the
out-of-court statements made by a nine-year-old, sexually abused girl to her
mother were admissible; the court looked at "the age of the child, the nature
of the assault, physical evidence of such assault, relationship of the child to
the defendant, contemporaneity and spontaneity of the assertions in relation
to the alleged assault, reliability of the assertions themselves, and the reliability of the testifying witness"); see also Oldsen v. People, 732 P.2d 1132, 1135-37
(Colo. 1986) (holding that the lower court erred in admitting a five-year-old
child's out-of-court statements to a school psychologist, physician, and social
worker under COLO. R EVID. 803(4) (medical diagnosis or treatment exception), but the majority of the appellate court affirmed on the ground that the
statements were admissible under COLO. R EVID. 803(24) (residual exception». The dissenting opinion found an inadequate record to support admissibility under COLO. R EVID. 803 (24). See id. at 1139; see also State v. McCafferty, 356 N.W.2d 159, 161-65 (S.D. 1984) (remanding for the determination of
whether a statement that did not qualify as an excited utterance or a present
sense impression fell within South Dakota's residual exception when a child
took the stand but could not testify meaningfully).
106. See, e.g., United States v. DeNoyer, 811 F.2d 436, 438 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding
statements that a five-year-old boy, who testified at trial, made to social workers were properly admitted under FED. R EVID. 803(4) (medical diagnosis or
treatment exception) and FED. R EVID. 803(24) (residual exception»; United
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similar residual exceptions to admit tender years statements. However, in State v. Walker,107 the Court of Appeals of Maryland narrowly
construed Maryland's residual hearsay exceptions, opining that it
would apply them only in unprecedented situations. !Os Judge Wilner,
writing for the majority, stated that the proponent of the hearsay
"must show an exceptional circumstance, not anticipated when the
rule was adopted." 109
Tender years statements and Maryland's statute were well
known when the catch-all rules were adopted in 1994.llo The Walker
court strongly suggested that the specific tender years statute is
likely to be read by the court of appeals as establishing the limits
for the admissibility of reliable tender years hearsay and precluding
the trial court's admission of other reliable tender years hearsay
under a catch-all exception. lll In any event, a specific tender years
exception, rather than reliance on the catch-all, has the advantage
of giving more detailed guidance to trial courts than do the residual
exceptions.

107.
108.
109.
110.

111.

States v. Dorian, 803 F.2d 1439, 1443-44 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding that when a
five-year-old girl testified at trial, but "because of her age and obvious fright,"
she did not testify meaningfully, her reliable out-of-court statement to her
emergency foster mother, that was made during a third interview on the subject, was properly admitted under FED. R EVID. 803 (24».
345 Md. 293, 691 A.2d 1341 (1997) (Chasanow, j., dissenting).
See id. at 329, 691 A.2d at 1359.
[d.
The General Assembly has the power to enact statutes allowing for the admission of hearsay. See MD. RULE 5-802 ("Except as otherwise provided by these
rules or permitted by applicable constitutional provisions or statutes, hearsay is
not admissible." (emphasis added».
Proposed MD. RULE 5-802.2 would have specifically incorporated the
tender years statute by reference. At a hearing held by the court of appeals on
the Proposed Rules, in response to questioning by the court, this author testified that there was no need to single out one statute for specific incorporation
into the rules because MD. RULE 5-802 covered the situation; Proposed MD.
RULE 5-802.2 could be read as intending a different effect as to other hearsay
statutes, and it could necessitate amending the rules when the Maryland General Assembly amended the tender years statute (as it subsequently has done).
Thus, the court's non-adoption of Proposed MD. RULE 5-802.2 ought not be
seen as evidencing any disapproval of the tender years exception.
See generally State v. Walker, 345 Md. 293, 691 A.2d 1341 (1997) (Chasanow, J.,
dissenting) .
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III. SUPREME COURT CASE LAW ON THE CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE
The federal 1l2 and Maryland 1l3 confrontation clauses-the right
of the accused to be confronted with opposing witnesses-apply
only in criminal cases. 114 The due process clauses1l5 reflect the same
concern by precluding the reliance on unreliable hearsay in civil
cases. 1I6 This section of the Article will address the limits, as established by Supreme Court case law, that an accused's confrontation
right places upon admitting hearsay statements.
A. If the Out-of Court Declarant Testifies at Trial and is Subject to CrossExamination

No conflict with an accused's confrontation right arises if the
out-of-court statement of a witness who testifies at trial is admitted
against the accused, as long as the accused has the opportunity to
cross-examine the witness concerning the statement. 117 Therefore,
112.
113.
114.
115.

See U.S. CaNST. amend. VI.
See MD. CaNST. art. 21.
See 1 MYERS, supra note 29, § 7.63.
See U.S. CaNST. amend. VI; Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 567-69 (1974);
MYERS, supra note 29, § 7.63; see also MD. CaNST. art. 21; if. United States v.
Baker, 45 F.3d 837, 847 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that a video conference pro- .
cedure for a civil commitment hearing does not violate due process).
116. See Kade v. Charles H. Hickey Sch., 80 Md. App. 721, 728, 566 A.2d 148, 152
(1989) (reversing an administrative agency's decision that was based on unreliable hearsay).
117. See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 556 (1988) (finding no error in admitting prior identification by victim witness, who, because of memory loss,
could not explain the basis for the identification); California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149, 153 (1970) (finding no error in admitting prior testimony of a prosecution witness who was subject to full cross-examination at trial); United States
v. Grooms, 978 F.2d 425, 426-28 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding that the trial court
properly admitted, under FED. R EVID. 803(24) (residual exception), child victims' out-of-court statements made to F.B.I. agents that were more detailed
than victims' in-court testimony; no violation of the Confrontation Clause occurred because the children were subject to extensive cross-examination, albeit limited by their lack of memory); if. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 860
(1990) (upholding the constitutionality of MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PRac.
§ 9-102 (1989) (current version at MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 774 (Supp.
1997) », that permits child witnesses for the prosecution to testify over closedcircuit television at trial if the court finds that testifying in the presence of the
accused child abuser would cause a child witness "serious emotional distress
such that the child cannot reasonably communicate"), on remand sub nom.,
Craig v. State, 322 Md. 418, 428-34, 588 A.2d 328, 333-36 (1991) (reversing the
conviction on statutory grounds for an inadequate finding of necessity to use
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the confrontation clauses are not offended when tender years hearsay of a child who testifies at trial is admitted.
However, as Judge Murnaghan of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit explained, the United States Supreme Court's case law "teaches that, where there are circumstances
assuring the accuracy of hearsay, cross-examination is not [required
or] talismanic of constitutional guarantees."118 Reliable hearsay,
therefore, may be admitted if the out-of-court declarant is either unable to testify at trial or is available to testify, but does not do so.ll9
B.

Hearsay Admissible Even When the Declarant Does Not Testify at Trial

The Supreme Court, in its 1980 decision in Ohio v. Roberts, 120
made clear that even if declarants are unavailable to testify at trial,
the admission of their out-of-court statements will not violate the
defendant's confrontation right if the hearsay statements either (1)
fall within well-established, historical hearsay exceptions, or (2) are
otherwise necessary and reliable-that is, they bear "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness." 121 In Roberts, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of admitting evidence against the accused under
the firmly rooted hearsay exception for prior testimony of a witness
unavailable at trial. 122
1.

The Rule Against Hearsay Has "Firmly Rooted" Exceptions

Subsequent to the Roberts decision, the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of admitting hearsay evidence against the
accused that fell within the firmly rooted exceptions: (1) statements
by a co-conspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy, 123

118.
119.
120.
121.

122.
123.

a closed-circuit because the trial judge failed to look into the possibility of a
two-way, rather than a one-way, closed-circuit television).
Ellison v. Sachs, 769 F.2d 955, 957 (4th Cir. 1985).
See generally id.
448 u.S. 56 (1980).
[d. at 66 ("Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness." (emphasis added».
See id. at 77; see also Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183-84 (1987) (finding no error in
admitting a statement when the declarant was unavailable to testify); United
States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986) (holding that a showing that the declarant
is unavailable to testify is not required); see also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 259.
Uohn William Strong et al., eds., 4th ed. 1992) (explaining the significance of
representative admissions and co-conspirator statements).
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(2) excited utterances,l24 and (3) statements made to a physician for
purposes of obtaining proper medical treatment. l25
As to each of these three categories, the Supreme Court has
held that the foundation supporting the' finding that the firmly
rooted hearsay exception applies is sufficient to show the degree of
reliability mandated by the Confrontation Clause. 126
The Court has suggested that because the out-of-court statement may be more reliable than the declarant's in-court testimony
would be, the circumstances supporting the reliability of the out-ofcourt statements-the furtherance of the conspiracy, the stress of
the event, or the need for medical treatment-cannot be duplicated
in court. 127
2. The Constitution Does Not Require the Child's Testimony at
Trial or a Showing of Unavailability When the Out-of-Court Statement is Sufficiently Reliable
Of the Supreme Court hearsay cases to date, only two have involved child abuse. In White v. Illinois,128 the Court upheld the constitutionality of the admission of a four-year-old child's out-of-court
statements regarding sexual assault, choking, and threatening by
her mother's friend in the child's bedroom.129 At trial, the childvictim was brought to the witness stand several times, but she was
too upset to testifY.l30 There was no showing made that she would
124. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1992). Unavailability of the declarant to testify need not be shown, nor need the declarant be produced at trial.
See id.
125. See id.; Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 946-47 n.9, 949-50 (4th Cir. 1988).
Unavailability of the declarant to testify need not be shown, nor need the declarant be produced at trial. See White, 502 U.S. at 356-57.
126. See White, 502 U.S. at 356.
127. See id. at 354-56 (" [T]he evidentiary rationale for permitting hearsay testimony
regarding spontaneous declarations and statements made in the course of receiving medical care is that such out-of-court declarations are made in contexts that provide substantial guarantees of their trustworthiness. But those
same factors that contribute to the statements' reliability cannot be recaptured
even by later in-court testimony.").
128. 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
129. See id. at 358.
130. See id. at 349. The Supreme Court's opinion states:
S.G. [the victim] never testified at petitioner's trial. The State attempted on two occasions to call her as a witness, but she apparently
experienced emotional difficulty on being brought to the courtroom
and in each instance left without testifying. App. 14. The defense
made no attempt to call S.G. as a witness, and the trial court neither
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have been competent to testify. The trial court admitted the testimony of five witnesses. 131 The first group consisted of the child's
baby-sitter, the child's mother, and a police officer; the second
group was an emergency room nurse and a physician. 132 The Court
considered the child's out-of-court statements to the first group
under the spontaneous declaration hearsay exception and those
spoken to the second group under the medical examination hearsay
exception. 133
The Supreme Court unanimously held that the defendant's
conviction was constitutionally obtained. 134 The Court found that
the out-of-court statements were sufficiently reliable; therefore, the
defendant's confrontation right had not been violated. 135 The Court
explained that the unavailability of the declarant to testify at trial
did not have to be shown, nor did the declarant have to be produced at trial. I36 The Chief Justice, writing for the Court, stated:
We therefore think it clear that the out-of-court statements
admitted in this case had substantial probative value, value
that could not be duplicated simply by the declarant later
testifying in court. To exclude such probative statements
under the strictures of the Confrontation Clause would be
the height of wrongheadedness, given that the Confrontation Clause has as a basic purpose "the promotion of the
"integrity of the factfinding process."137

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

made, nor was asked to make, a finding that S.C. was unavailable to
testifY.
Id. at 350.
See id. at 350-51.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 356-57.
See id.
See id.
Id. (quoting Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020 (1988) (quoting Kentucky v.
Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 736 (1987»); see also Larson v. Nutt, 34 F.3d 647 (8th
Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (finding that three-year-old declarant's availability and
ability to testify at trial was irrelevant for purposes of Confrontation Clause
analysis; admission of declarant's out-of-court statement was found to have particular guarantees of trustworthiness and, thus, did not violate the defendant's
confrontation right); McCafferty v. Leapley, 944 F.2d 445, 454 (8th Cir. 1991)
(finding that there was no denial of the defendant's confrontation right when
the court admitted the sexually abused child's hearsay statements).
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3. Sufficiently Reliable Hearsay That Does Not Fall Within A
"Firmly Rooted" Hearsay Exception
The Constitution does not require that the out-of-court declarant is competent to testify at trial, but precludes the consideration
of corroborative evidence to show reliability.138 When, as under a
tender years exception, the hearsay admitted against an accused
does not fall within a firmly rooted exception, the Supreme Court
has held that particularized guarantees of trustworthiness must be
shown. '39 In Idaho v. Wright,'40 a child's out-of-court statement was
admitted under a residual hearsay exception. 141 The residual exception is a general catch-all for other sufficiently reliable hearsay;
whether particular evidence meets its criteria must be determined
on a case-by-case basis.
In an opinion authored by Justice O'Connor, the Wright Court
held that the requisite "'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' must be shown from the totality of the circumstances."'42 However, in a five-ta-four decision on this issue, the Court forbade the
consideration of corroborating evidence, including the older sister's
testimony.143 In doing so, the majority stated that "we think the relevant circumstances include only those that surround the making of
See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 824 (1990).
See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 57 (1980).
497 U.S. 805 (1990).
See id. at 817 (admitting an out-of-court statement under Idaho's residual hearsay exception (similar to MD. RULE 5-803 (b) (24»). Justice O'Connor, writing
for the Court, explained:
In Roberts, we suggested that the "indicia of reliability" requirement
could be met in either of two circumstances: where the hearsay statement "falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception," or where it is
supported by "a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." 448 U.S., at 66; see also Bourjaily, [483 U.S.] at 183 (" [T] he coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule is firmly enough rooted in
our jurisprudence that, under this Court's holding in Roberts, a court
need not independently inquire into the reliability of such statements"); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 543 (1986) ("[E]ven if certain
hearsay evidence does not fall within 'a firmly rooted hearsay exception' and is thus presumptively unreliable and inadmissible for Confrontation Clause purposes, it may nonetheless meet Confrontation
Clause reliability standards if it is supported by a 'showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness''') (footnote and citation
omitted).
Wright, 497 U.S. at 816-17 (alterations in original).
142. See Wright, 497 U.S. at 816-17.
143. See id.

138.
139.
140.
141.
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the statement and that render the declarant particularly worthy of
belief." 144
In Wright, a divorced mother and her live-in boyfriend (whom
her children called "Daddy") were both convicted of sexual abuse
of the woman's daughters, who were two-and-one-half and five-andone-half-years old at the time the crimes were charged. 14s The allegations surfaced when the older daughter told her father's girlfriend that the girls' mother had held her down and covered her
mouth while the boyfriend had sexual intercourse with her, and
that she had seen them do the same thing to the younger sister. 146
The father's girlfriend called the police and took the older girl
to the hospital, where an examination revealed evidence of sexual
abuse. 147 The next day, an examination of the younger girl revealed
"conditions 'strongly suggestive of . . . vaginal contact,' occurring
approximately two to three days" earlier. 148
At trial, the examining physician testified to the younger
daughter's statements that were made to him during the examination, identifYing the mother's boyfriend as the abuser.149 Both the
mother and the boyfriend were convicted of lewd conduct with a
minor under sixteen. ISO Only the mother appealed on the Confrontation Clause ground, and she appealed only from the conviction
regarding the younger daughter. 151
The Court assumed that the two-and-one-half-year-old daughter
144. Id. Justice Kennedy, dissenting, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White and Blackmun, found that circumscription is "as unworkable as it is illogical." [d. at 833-34 (Rehnquist, CJ., & White, Blackmun, Kennedy, lJ., dissenting); see also Ellison v. Sachs, 769 F.2d 955, 959 (4th Cir. 1985) (differentiating carefully between the victim's uncorroborated out-of-court statements of
identification, which "contained no sufficient assurance of accuracy," and her
out-of-court statement, corroborated by physical evidence, that she was sexually assaulted); Serrato, supra note 47, at 162 (citing to studies and cases indicating that only a small percentage of abuse victims fabricate their allegations); cf Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 604-{)5 (1994) (evaluating
a statement offered under the hearsay exception for declarations against penal interest, under all the relevant circumstances, to determine whether each
part of it was sufficiently deserving to be reliable).
145. See Wright, 497 U.S. at 808.
146. See id. at 809.
147. See id.
148. [d.
149. See id. at 809-11.
150. See id. at 812.
151. See id. at 813.
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was unavailable to testify at the trial. 152 It then "reject[ed] [the
mother's] contention that the younger daughter's out-of-court statements in this case [were] per se unreliable, or at least presumptively
unreliable, on the ground that the trial court found the younger
daughter incompetent to testify at trial."153 Rather than equating incompetency with unreliability, the Court held that a case-by-case inquiry as to the reliability of the out-of-court statement is required:
[T] he Confrontation Clause does not erect a per se rule
barring the admission of prior statements of a declarant
who is unable to communicate to the jury at the time of
trial. Although such inability might be relevant to whether
the earlier hearsay statement possessed particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, a per se rule of exclusion would
not only frustrate the truth-seeking purpose of the Confrontation Clause, but would also hinder States in their own
"enlightened development in the law of evidence."154
In its discussion, the Wright Court approved the state courts'
use of factors, such as those set forth in Article 27, Section 775 (d)
of the Annotated Code of Maryland,155 in determining "whether the
child declarant was particularly likely to be telling the truth when
the [out-of-court] statement was made."156 It also rejected the imposition of a constitutional requirement that the out-of-court statements be videotaped. For the majority, Justice O'Connor wrote:
"The state and federal courts have identified a number of factors
152. See id. at 815-16.
153. [d. at 824. The Court continued:
First, respondent's contention rests upon a questionable reading
of the record in this case. The trial court found only that the
younger daughter was "not capable of communicating to the jury."
App. 39. Although Idaho law provides that a child witness may not
testify if he "appear[s] incapable of receiving just impressions of the
facts respecting which they are examined, or of relating them truly,"
Idaho Code § 9-202 (Supp. 1989); Idaho Rule Evid. 601(a), the trial
court in this case made no such findings. Indeed, the more reasonable inference is that, by ruling that the statements were admissible
under Idaho's residual hearsay exception, the trial court implicitly
found that the younger daughter, at the time she made the statements, was capable of receiving just impressions of the facts and of
relating them truly. See App. 115.
Wright, 497 U.S. at 824-25 (alteration in original).
154. Wright, 497 U.S. at 825 (citations omitted).
155. For the full text of § 775, with amendments, see the Appendix to this Article.
156. Wright, 497 U.S. at 822.
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that we think properly relate to whether hearsay statements made
by a child witness in child sexual abuse cases are reliable." 157 In developing a test for Confrontation Clause challenges, Justice
O'Conner stated:
Although the procedural guidelines propounded by the
court below may well enhance the reliability of out-of-court
statements of children regarding sexual abuse, we decline
to read into the Confrontation Clause a preconceived and
artificial litmus test for the procedural propriety of professional interviews in which children make hearsay statements
against a defendant."158
Nonetheless, the majority found the particular statement at issue in Wright to be insufficiently reliable under the totality of the
circumstances, thus failing to satisfy the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. 159 The child had not volunteered the information
when asked general questions, and she gave pertinent responses
only when asked detailed leading questions. 160 Therefore, the admission of the doctor's testimony as to the child's statements was reversible error in light of the record as a whole. 161
An example of the application of Wright's test for evaluating the
reliability of children's out-of-court statements admitted under a
non-firmly rooted hearsay exception is found in Doe v. United
States. 162 In Doe, the statements were made by a three-year-old girl
and a three-year-old boy, who were from two different families, to
their respective parents. 163 The detail, language, and other factors of
the statements were held to provide sufficient indicia of reliability,
and their admission at trial was upheld on appeal. l64
C. Maryland Case Law on the Constitutionality of the Tender Years
Statute

Maryland's high court follows the Supreme Court case law on
the confrontation right, because it construes the Maryland and fed157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

[d. at 821.
[d. at 819.
See id. at 818-21.
See id. at 810-11.
See id. at 827.
976 F.2d 1071 (7th Cir. 1992).
See id. at 1073-74.
See id. at 1077-79 (detailing the statements); see also id. at 1079-82 (analyzing
the reliability of the statements).
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eral clauses in pari materia. 165 Maryland's tender years statute, as initially adopted in 1988, was upheld as facially constitutional by the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland in an unreported opinion. l66
IV. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TENDER YEARS STATUTE:
CHRONICLING THE "TENDER YEARS" WAR

A.

The 1988 Statute

The tender years statute is a perennial issue before the Maryland General Assembly. Since 1988, when the Maryland General Assembly first enacted Section 9-103.1 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Annotated Code l67 (1988 Statute),
bills proposing changes to the statute have been introduced every
year. Some liberalization has been accomplished; however, attempts
to both extend the statute and to retrench it failed in the 1997 legislative sessions. Most recently, the statute was mildly extended in
the 1998 session}68
1. Types of Proceedings in Which the Hearsay Exception Was
Available
The 1988 Statute applied only to the possible admissibility of
statements of child-victims under the age of twelve in criminal proceedings "concerning an alleged offense against the child [who
made the statement] of ... [c]hild abuse, as defined under Article
27, § 35A of the Code."169 Thus, the 1988 Statute did not apply in
non-criminal proceedings, such as suits involving child custody, visitation, and protective orders; suits for damages resulting from child
abuse; and juvenile proceedings, whether delinquency or Child in
165. See 6 MCLAIN, supra note 70, § 80Ll n.4.
166. See Bethea v. State, Nos. 1546 & 1550 (Md. App. June 19, 1990) (per curiam).
167. See S. 66, 1988 Md. Laws ch. 548 (codified at MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC.
§ 9-103.1 (Supp. 1988) (current version at MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 775 (1997)
(amended 1998»). Because citation to superseded versions of the tender years
statute, codified in § 9-103.1, would not provide the easiest means to locate
this source, citations are made to the enacted bills found in the volumes of
Laws of the State of Maryland. Likewise, citations are made to either the Senate
or House bill, which both contain the enacted version (with deletions and additions reflecting amendments), when no comparison is necessary.
168. See H.D. 590 (Md. 1988) (effective October 1, 1998), available in <http://
mlis.state.md.us/1998rs/billfile/HB0590.htm> (visited April 20, 1998); see also
supra note 11, 246 and accompanying text (detailing 1998 amendments). Section 777, with amendments, is reprinted in the Appendix to this Article.
169. S. 66, sec. 1, § 9-103.1 (b) (1).
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Need of Assistance (CINA) proceedings. 17o
The 1988 Statute was also inapplicable in criminal proceedings
with regard to any other charged crime, such as a sexual offense
under Article 27, Sectio'ns 464B and 464C of the Maryland Annotated Code, and a crime of violence under Article 27, Section 643B
of the Maryland Annotated Code. 171 Senate Bill 66, in the form in
which it first passed the Maryland Senate, would have extended the
1988 Statute to Sections 35A and 643B crimes; however, in conference, the Senate acceded to the Maryland House of Delegates' version, which had no such extension. 172
2. The Introduction of the Restrictive "Categories" of Possible
Witnesses
Senate Bill 66 would have given the prosecution the opportunity to demonstrate that a particular statement was reliable without
restrictions regarding to whom the statement was made. 173 However,
the House Judiciary Committee severely limited the statute to apply
only to statements made and testified to by a licensed physician, licensed psychologist, or licensed social worker who was acting in the
course of his profession when the child made the statement. 174 In
conference, the Senate added "a teacher" to the list of potential
fact witnesses to the child's statement. 175
Under the 1988 Statute and its current version, if the child's
first report of the alleged abuse was to someone other than a person in one of the listed professions, then in order for the prosecution to invoke the hearsay exception, the child must be taken to see
a teacher, physician, psychologist, social worker, etc. If the child
again complains of abuse in the presence of one of these persons,
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See id. (striking provisions which would have extended the 1988 Statute); H.D.
1018, 1988 Md. Laws ch. 549 (omitting provisions).
173. See S. 66. See generally Hamish v. State, 9 Md. App. 546, 549-51, 266 A.2d 364,
365-66 (1970) (focusing on the reliability of the statement itself and not emphasizing to whom it was made).
174. See HD. 1018, sec.1, § 9-103.1(b)(2).
175. See S. 66, sec. 1, § 9-103.1 (b)(2) (i)(4). The 1988 Statute incorporated specific
definitions of the terms "licensed physician," "licensed psychologist," and "licensed social worker." See id. § 9-103.1 (b) (2) (i)(1)-(3). However, the 1988 Statute provided no definition of the term "teacher." See id. § 9-103.1 (b) (2) (1) (4).
The current version also does not define "teacher." See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 775 (b) (2) (i) (4) (Supp. 1997) (amended 1998).
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the prosecution could offer that person as a witness for the purpose
of testifying to the child's statement made to them.
3.

Pre-trial Notice and Judicial Determination as to Reliability

The 1988 Statute required the State to provide pre-trial notice
of its intention to offer testimony under the tender years exception
and of the contents of the statement. 176 After pre-trial notice, the
trial court must conduct a hearing outside the presence of the jury
to "make a finding on the record as to the specific guarantees of
trustworthiness that are present in the statement,"177 and the court
must thereafter rule on the statement's admissibility.178 The twelve
specific guarantees and considerations listed in the 1988 Statute
were those generally found in pre-existing models and other states'
statutes. 179 The conference committee deleted from the list a factor
included in Senate Bill 66--"whether the statement was audiotaped
or videotaped, if taping would have been reasonably feasible. "180

4.

Corroboration Requirement

When the child-victim was unavailable to testify, the 1988 Statute further conditioned admissibility of an out-of-court statement
that was otherwise qualified on the existence of corroborative evidence. 181 The statute left that phrase undefined. 182 The Senate bill
had required "corroborative evidence of the alleged offense. "183 The
House bill did not employ the prepositional phrase "of the alleged
offense." 184 In conference, the Senate acceded to the House
version. 185
176. See S. 66, sec. 1, § 9-103.1(c)(3); see also § 775(c) (3); Bruce v. State, 96 Md.
App. 510, 524-25, 625 A.2d 416, 423 (1993).
177. S. 66, sec. 1, § 9-103.1(e)(I); accord § 775(e)(I).
178. See S. 66, sec. 1, § 9-103.1 (e) (2); see also § 775(e) (2).
179. Compare Lynn McLain, Maryland's Statutory Hearsay Exception for Reliable Statements I7y Alleged Child Abuse Victims: A Hesitant Step Forward, 17 U. BALT. L. REv.
1, 19 n.74 (1987) (compiling 18 considerations suggested or adopted by
courts, commentators, legislatures, and organizations), with S. 66, sec. 1, § 9103.1 (d) (1 )-( 12) (codifYing 12 of the 18 considerations).
180. S. 66. This deletion warrants the inference that the absence of taping should
not be considered a negative factor.
181. See id. § 9-103.1 (c) (2) (iii).
182. See id.
183. [d.
184. See H.D. 1018, 1988 Md. Laws ch. 549.
185. See S. 66.
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5. Restrictions as to Child's Testifying or Being Unavailable to
Testify
Under the 1988 Statute, an out-of-court statement that the trial
judge found reliable was admissible if the child either testified at
trial or if the child was unavailable to testify for certain reasons. 186
First, the statement was admissible "if the child is subject to crossexamination about the out of court statement and testifies: (i) at
the criminal proceeding; or (ii) by c1osed-circuit television."187
Second, the statement was admissible if the child was unavailable to testify due to one of four following reasons:
1. Death;
2. Absence from the jurisdiction, for good cause shown,
and the state has been unable to procure the child's
presence by subpoena or other reasonable means;
3. Serious physical disability; or
4. Inability to communicate about the alleged offense due
to serious emotional distress. 188
The first three grounds for establishing unavailability were well
established. 189 The fourth ground was similar to Maryland's statutory
prerequisite for allowing a child to testify over closed-circuit television,190 but for purposes of the 1988 Act, the child's inability to
communicate would have to have been so extreme as to preclude
even televised testimony.
Without explanation, the 1988 Statute omitted other recognized bas~s for unavailability, including the child's complete failure
of memory; persistent refusal to testify, despite judicial requests;
mental disability; privilege; and incompetency at the time of trial. 191
In particular, the exclusion of incompetency as a basis for unavailability has severely undercut the usefulness of the tender years hearsay exception, because a court's ruling that a young child is incomSee id. sec. 1, § 9-103.1 (c)(I)-(2).
Id. § 9-103.1(c)(I).
Id. § 9-103.1(c)(I)(i).
See McLain, supra note 179, at 35 & n.142 (noting these three grounds were
taken from the rules governing use of depositions at trial, and citing MD. RULE
2-419(a)(3),4-261(h)(I».
190. See MD. CODE ANN., Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 9-102 (Supp. 1987) (permitting closedcircuit testimony if "[t]he judge determines that testimony by the child victim
in the courtroom will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress
such that the child cannot reasonably communicate") (current version at MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 774(2) (Supp. 1997».
191. Compare FED. R EVID. 804(a) (1)-(4), with S. 66.
186.
187.
188.
189.
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petent to testify frequently results in the State dropping its
charges. 192
In 1988, although the Maryland General Assembly had before it
several bills that would have provided that all children who were victims of child abuse or of particular sexual offenses were competent
to testify, those bills were defeated in the House Judiciary Committee. 193 If any of those bills had passed, excluding incompetency as a
factor in determining unavailability would have been understandable. In the long run, however, such a law would not have been advisable because a conclusive (rather than a rebuttable) presumption
of competency 194 would likely violate due process. 195
6.

Accused's Right to Take Deposition

A novel and unique provision in the 1988 Statute gave the
defendant the right to depose the witness offered by the State to
192. See generally Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 943 (4th Cir. 1988) ("Often, the
child is the only witness. Yet age may make the child incompetent to testify in
court . . . . •[[W]] hen the choice is between evidence which is less than best
and no evidence at all, only clear folly would dictate an across-the-board policy of doing without.''' (quoting FED. R EVID. art. VIII advisory committee's
note» .
193. See S. 280, MARYLAND SENATE JOURNAL 331-32 (1988) (full text of bill on file
with author); H.D. 378, MARYLAND HOUSE JOURNAL 379-80 (1988) (full text of
bill on file with author).
194. See S. 280. Senate Bill 280 passed the Maryland Senate by a 45-to-l vote, see
MARYLAND SENATE JOURNAL 1417 (1988), but received an unfavorable report in
the House Judiciary Committee, see generally MARYLAND HOUSE JOURNAL 199
(1988) (index) (containing only one reference to H.D. 378, which referred
the bill to the House Judiciary Committee). It would have repealed MD. CODE
ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC., § 9-103 (Supp. 1987) ("In a criminal trial, the age of a
child may not be the reason for precluding a child from testifYing."), and
amended id. § 9-101, adding the following provision:
(B)(I)Notwithstanding any other provision of law or rule of evidence, a child victim under the age of 12 is a competent witness and
shall be allowed to testify without prior qualification in the following
cases:
(i) Child abuse, as defined in § 5-701 of the family law article or
article 27, § 35A of the Code;
(ii) A sexual offense, as defined in article 27, § 464, § 464A,
§ 464B, or 464C of the Code; or
(iii) Rape, as defined in article 27, § 462 or § 463 of the Code,
(2) The trier of fact shall determine the weight and credibility to
be given to the child victim's testimony."
S.280.
195. See 5 MCLAIN, supra note 70, § 301.5.
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testify as to the child's statement. 196 In other criminal cases, there is
no such right.

B.

Subsequent Amendments

Numerous amendments have been made to Section 9-103.1
since its enactment in 1988.

1. Types of Proceedings in which the Tender Years Exception
Applicable

IS

A 1991 amendment extended Section 9-103.1 to apply in CINA
proceedings concerning an alleged offense against the child of
abuse or neglect. 197 Effective October 1, 1992, Section 9-103.1 was
made applicable to alleged offenses of rape or sexual offense 198 and
assault with intent to commit rape or sexual offense. 199 Effective October 1, 1994, the Section 9-103.1 hearsay exception was extended to
apply in juvenile court proceedings. 2°O Finally, a 1996 Act inexplicably transferred the tender years statute to Section 775 of Article 27,
despite the fact that it applies in CINA and juvenile delinquency
proceedings. 201

2.

What Constituted Unavailability to Testify

There are difficulties in finding satisfactory language to extend
the definition of unavailability to include a young child who is declared incompetent to testify at trial. Therefore, Section 9-103.1 was
ultimately changed in 1994 to make the tender years exception
available regardless whether the child testifies or is available to testify.202 Thus, a child's out-of-court statement that otherwise qualifies
may be reviewed for reliability, whether the court finds that child
unavailable or not.
See S. 66, sec. 1, § 9-103.1 (c) (4) (i).
See H.D. 765, sec. 1, § 9-103.1(b)(1), 1991 Md. Laws ch. 399.
See S. 429, sec. 1, § 9-103:l(b)(1) (ii), 1992 Md. Laws ch. 253.
See id. § 9-103.1 (b) (1) (iii).
See S. 340, sec. 1, § 9-103.1(b)(l) (iv) , 1994 Md. Laws ch. 169.
See 1996 Md. Laws ch. 585, § 5. The provision regarding closed-circuit testimony was likewise transferred to Section 774, but, unlike Section 775, it applies only in criminal cases. See id. Further, in 1996, the reference to Article
27, Section 35(a) was changed to Section 35(c). See 1996 Md. Laws ch. 10.
This effected no substantive change.
202. SeeS. 340, sec. 1, § 9-103.1 (c)(ii).
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
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the Maryland General Assembly considered
redress the 1988 Statute's per se inapplicabilgeneris definition of unavailability, when a
incompetent to testify at trial.

Language of the Bills

Senate Bill 498, proposed in the 1993 session, would have added, as a ground for unavailability, a child victim's "inability to testify due to ... incompetence.''203 This would have directly addressed
the problem. 204 Several other states explicitly permit the potential
admission of out-of-court statements by children found "incompetent" or "disqualified" to testify.205 Senate Bill 498 was amended,
however, to refer more narrowly to a child's "incompetency to testify due to age."206 A serious problem arose, because in 1985 the
General Assembly had passed Section 9-103 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article,207 which provides that, "[i]n a criminal
trial, the age of a child may not be the reason for precluding a
child from testifying. "208 Thus, Senate Bill 498 referred to a null
class: no child could legally be found incompetent due to age.
In order to circumvent the uselessness of Senate Bill 498, Senate Bill 340 was proposed in the 1994 legislative session. 209 It proposed to amend Section 9-103.1 to provide:
(c)(2)(i) The child is unavailable to testify at the criminal proceeding or CINA proceeding due to the child's:
203. S. 498, sec. 1, § 9-103.1 (c)(2) (i)(5), MARYLAND SENATE JOURNAL 430 (1993) (full
text of bill on file with author).
204. See generally supra notes 191-192 and accompanying text.
205. See AlA. CODE § 15-25-32 (1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3513(a) (1995); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60460(dd) (Supp. 1997); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 233, § 81(b)
(West 1997); OR. R EVID. 803(18a)(b); R.I. GEN. LAws § 14-1-69 (1995); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 19-1-180 (West Supp. 1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.13:2
(Michie 1995 & Supp. 1997).
206. S. 498, sec. 1, § 9-103.1 (c) (2) (i) (5).
207. See 1985 Md. Laws ch. 498 (codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CTs. &
JUD. PROC. § 9-103 (1995».
208. § 9-103. Section 9-103 merely codified the common-law rule that extreme
youth is not a per se bar to a child's testimony; rather, the trial judge must individually examine children as to their ability to give competent testimony. See
MuRPHY, supra note 64, § 602(A) ("[A]ge alone ha[s] never been the test for
incompetency [in Maryland].").
209. See S. 340, 1994 Md. Laws ch. 169 (containing bill as enacted and deleted provisions).
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5. Level of cognitive development, including ability to understand abstract concepts, capacity for long-term memory, and
ability to articulate upon demand. 210
This proposed provision ("incompetency exception") was explained
in a fact sheet submitted by Ellen Mugmon, a member of the Gov"ernor's Council on Child Abuse and Neglect:
The reasons for this provision include: (1) [children's] inability to understand the abstract concept of an oath; (2)
fading of their memories during the delay between the
crime and the court appearance; and (3) their inability to
articulate upon demand because of anxiety and fear of the
proceedings, or because they are too young to come up
with a command performance at a specific time. 211
The incompetency exception avoided conflict with Section 9-103 because these factors, although related to age, do not refer to chronological age.
Explaining the whys and wherefores of this language to the legislators proved problematic. First, legislators had difficulty understanding how a child who could be physically present at trial could
be considered "unavailable to testify." Second, they struggled with
the counter-intuitive concept that a child might be incompetent to
testify, but still could have made a reliable out-of-court statement
before trial.
ii. How Can a Physically Available Child Be Unavailable as a
Witness?
Some opponents of the incompetency exception have argued
that it is nonsensical to say that a child who is physically available to
be brought into the courtroom at trial is nonetheless unavailable.
The answer to this is that "unavailable to testify" simply means that
the witness is unable to be cross-examined at the trial or proceeding. Physical inability to come to court or the parties' inability to
serve a person with process are only two examples of
unavailability.212
210. Id. sec. 1, § 9-103.1(c)(2)(i) (deleted from enacted bill).
211. Memorandum from Ellen Mugmon, Member, Governor's Council on Child
Abuse and Neglect, to the Maryland House of Delegates Judiciary Committee
(April 3, 1994) (on file with author). See generally 1 MYERS, supra note 29,
§§ 3.1 to -.24.
212. See MD. RULE 5-804.

1997]

"Tender Years" War

53

Unavailable witnesses also include those who can be present or
are present in the courtroom, but who refuse to testifY despite the
court's order to do so.213 In addition, unavailability encompasses witnesses whom the court rules protect by a privilege against testifying,214 or because of their mental incapacity.215 The defense cannot
cross-examine a child whom the court has declared unable to testifY.
Therefore, when the court determines that a child is incompetent
to testifY, while that child may be physically able to testifY, he is unavailable to testifY under Maryland law.
How Can a Child Who is Found Incompetent to TestifY at Trial
Have Possibly Made a Reliable Out-of-Court Statement?

lll.

In the past, opponents of the incompetency exception have
questioned how a witness who is unqualified to testifY at trial could
possibly have made a reliable out-of-court statement. First, it is important to stress the word "possibly," within the context of Maryland's tender years statute. The incompetency exception only opens
the door to consideration by the court as to whether a particular
statement is reliable. It in no way directs that all statements will
have sufficient indicia of reliability; it simply provides that some
statements might, and statements should be looked at on a case-bycase basis. The incompetency exception dismantles the per se ban
against admissibility. This type of reasoning is in accord with the jurisprudence of other states216 and the Supreme Court. 217
213. See id. 5-804 (a) (2).
214. See id. 5-804(a) (1).
215. See id. 5-804(a)(4); see also id. 2418(a)(3)(C), 4-261 (h) (I)(B); Brown v. State,
317 Md. 417, 420-21, 564 A.2d 772, 774 (1989); People v. District Court of El
Paso County, 776 P.2d 1083, 1087 (Colo. 1989) ("In Colorado, a child who is
not competent to testify is unavailable within the meaning of section 13-25129(1) (b)(II). This rule reflects a common-sense understanding that when a
party is prohibited by a court from testifying, neither the prosecution nor defense is able to call the party to testify." (citations omitted».
216. See El Paso County, 776 P.2d at 1087 ("[W]e promote the rule that a child's
out-of-court declaration is not automatically rendered inadmissible merely because the child was found to be not competent at the competency hearing
. . . . A child's reliable out-of-court statement that accurately relates an incident of abuse will not be barred . . . . "); Perez v. State, 536 So. 2d 206, 211
(Fla. 1989) ("The fact that a child is incompetent to testify at trial ... does
not necessarily mean that the child is unable to state the truth. The requirement that the trial court find that the time, content, and circumstances of the
statement provide sufficient safeguards of reliability furnishes a sufficient guarantee of trustworthiness of the hearsay statement, obviating the necessity that
the child understand the duty of a witness to tell the truth."); People v.

54

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 27

Secondly, it is well established under Maryland law that one
need not qualify as a competent witness at trial in order to have the
ability to have made out-of-court statements that qualify as admissible hearsay.218
Maryland courts have admitted out-of-court statements of adult
witnesses that qualify under exceptions to the hearsay rule without
considering whether the out-of-court declarants would have been
competent to testify at trial.219 Additionally, Maryland courts have
admitted hearsay when the out-of-court declarant was capable of
making cogent, reliable statements in the past, but was not capable
of doing so at trial. 220

217.

218.

219.
220.

Rocha, 547 N.E.2d 1335, 1341 (Ill. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that incompetency
to testify due to either an inability to communicate or tender years does not
necessarily render the out-<>f-court statement unreliable); State v. Gribble, 804
P.2d 634,639 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) ("[A] finding of reliability through use of
[particularized] factors is a sufficient assurance of trustworthiness to make unnecessary an inquiry into testimonial competence at the time the hearsay
statements are made."); 1 MYERS, supra note 28, § 1.38; see also Miller v. State,
517 N.E.2d 64, 72 n.7 (Ind. 1987) (upholding the constitutionality of a state
statute that required a child victim to be incompetent before her videotaped
testimony could be admitted).
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1992) (quoting Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S.
1012, 1020 (1988) (quoting Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 736 (1987»); see
also Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 825 (1990) ("[T]he Confrontation Clause
does not erect a per se rule barring the admission of prior statements of a declarant who is unable to communicate to the jury at the time of trial. Although such inability might be relevant to whether the earlier hearsay statement possessed particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, a per se rule of
exclusion would not only frustrate the truth-seeking purpose of the Confrontation Clause, but would also hinder States in their own 'enlightened development in the law of evidence.' " (citations omitted»; see supra note 137 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Embrey v. Holly, 48 Md. App. 571, 597-601, 429 A.2d 251, 268-69
(1981) (holding that the identity of anonymous phone callers, which would be
necessary to determine their competency, was not necessary to admit their
out-<>f-court statements under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule;
the only requirement was that the statement was made with apparent sincerity), aff'd in part and reu'd in part on other grounds, 293 Md. 128, 442 A.2d 966
(1982).
See id.
See, e.g., Contee v. State, 229 Md. 486, 490-92, 184 A.2d 823, 825-26 (1962)
(finding that prior testimony was admissible upon the testimony of the director of a mental hospital that the declarant had been declared insane, permanently committed subsequent to her original testimony, and incapable of testifying at the time of trial); Johnson v. State, 63 Md. App. 485, 490-94, 494 A.2d
1343, 1347-48 (1985) (holding admissible an excited utterance of a victim who
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In this respect, the courts have treated children's statements
the same way as they have treated adults. Maryland cases have held
admissible out-of-court statements of children, qualifying under established exceptions to the hearsay rule, even though the children
were too young to testify at trial.22 I Maryland case law is in accord
with that of the federal courts222 and other jurisdictions on this
point. 223

221.

•

222.
223.

was incompetent at trial, but who had been "apparently capable of maintaining herself in her own apartment" at the time of the statement). Notably,
these cases do not distinguish between incompetency due to youth and incompetency due to mental illness or insanity; Senate Bill 340 would have included
the former but not the latter in the definition of "unavailable." See S. 340, sec.
1, § 9-103.1 (c) (2) (i) (5), 1994 Md. Laws ch. 169 (deleted from enacted bill).
See Jackson v. State, 31 Md. App. 332, 336, 343, 356 A.2d 299, 301, 304 (1976);
Moore v. State, 26 Md. App. 556, 561, 338 A.2d 344, 34647 (1975) (holding
that the out-of-court statements made by a three-and-one-half-year-old victim
of physical abuse to a physician in the emergency room were properly admitted; relying on Dean Wigmore and McCormick, the Court stated that the issue of testimonial competence of the child was "irrelevant since the testimonial qualifications do not apply to spontaneous declarations."); Smith v. State,
6 Md. App. 581, 587, 252 A.2d 277, 281 (1969) (finding that an excited utterance of child who was incompetent to testify at trial was properly admitted).
See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818, 820 n.2 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding that
although the child interviewed on videotape by a doctor was not competent to
testify, others could have testified to provide the proper foundation for admitting the child's out-of-court statements under FED. R EVID. 803(4), and that
the treating doctor's role was explained to the child and that she understood
it); Doe v. United States, 976 F.2d 1071, 1082 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding no abuse
of discretion in admitting children's hearsay statements under the catch-all
hearsay exception, even though the district court conducted no. inquiry to determine the competency of the three-year-old declarants); Myatt v. Hannigan,
910 F.2d 680, 682, 685 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that Kansas's child hearsay
statute did not violate the Confrontation Clause, nor did the admission of an
"unqualified" child's reliable out-of-court statements to a social worker and a
police officer); Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 94647 & n.9, 949-50 (4th Cir.
1988) (finding it reversible error to exclude a young child's spontaneous declarations made from the time she was two-and-one-half until she was threeand-one-half, that were excited utterances to her mother and statements made
to a child psychologist for purposes of medical treatment, even if declarant
was incompetent to testify at trial); United States v. Dorian, 803 F.2d 1439,
144244 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding that when a five-year-old girl testified at trial,
but "because of her age and obvious fright," she did not testify meaningfully,
her reliable out-of-court statement to her emergency foster mother, made during the third interview on the subject, was properly admitted under FED. R
EVID.803(24».
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iv. Ultimate Resolution by Finessing the Issue: In Camera Examination and Corroboration Requirements
Difficulty in coming up with a saleable and pragmatic definition of "incompetency to testify" led to a jettisoning of the attempt
to do so. Instead, Senate Bill 340 was amended in 1994 so that the
tender years exception is potentially applicable "regardless of
whether the child testifies. "224 Thus, the statement of a child who is
incompetent to testify can be evaluated for reliability by the court
because an incompetent child may be either available or unavailable
to testify.
(a)

In Camera Examination of Child

In determining the admissibility of a child's statement, Maryland's tender years statute requires an in camera examination, except
"where the child (i) [h]as died, or (ii) [i]s absent from the jurisdiction for good cause shown, or the State has been unable to procure
the child's presence by subpoena or other reasonable means."225
The court must conduct such examination of a child in the presence of the defense attorney and the prosecutor, but "may not permit" the presence of the defendant. 226
•
(b)

Corroboration Requirement
Furthermore, under the 1994 amendment:
[i]f the child does not testify, the child's out of court statement will be admissible only if there is corroborative evidence that: (i) [t]he defendant in a criminal proceeding
had the opportunity to commit the alleged offense; or (ii)
the alleged offender in a juvenile court proceeding had the
opportunity to commit the alleged abuse or neglect. 227

In Idaho v. Wright,228 the United States Supreme Court decided
that corroborative evidence cannot be used to support a finding of
sufficient reliability of an out-of-court statement. 229 However, this decision does not preclude a state from adding a corroboration re224. S. 340, sec. 1, § 9-103.1 (c)(1) (ii); accord MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 775(c)(1)(ii)
(Supp. 1997) (amended 1998).
225. See § 775 (f) (1). Section 775, with amendments, is reprinted in the Appendix
to this Article.
226. [d. § 775 (f) (2) (ii) (2).
227. [d. § 775 (c) (2).
228. 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
229. See id. at 823.
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quirement as a second hurdle to admissibility. The 1994 Maryland
amendment adds this requirement when the child does not testify
at trial. 230

h.

MSTA's Proposed Amendments

In 1997, the Maryland State Teachers' Association (MSTA) lobbied strenuously against any extension of the tender years exception. MSTA also submitted several retrenching amendments, including one that would return Maryland to pre-1994 law as to children
who are incompetent to testify at trial "because of age."231 Under
this proposed amendment, a judge could not consider admitting
these children's statements because they would neither testify nor
be unavailable. A fundamental purpose of the statute in the first
place-admitting reliable evidence when the child is too young to
testify232-would be frustrated by this proposed amendment.
The MSTA's amendment would require that:
the child testifies at the trial; or is found by the court to be unavailable as a witness for one (1) of the following reasons:
1. From the testimony of a psychiatrist, physician, or psychologist, and other evidence, if any, the court finds that the child's
testifying in the physical presence of the defendant will cause
the child to suffer serious emotional distress such that the child
cannot reasonably communicate; or
2. is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because
of death or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity;
or
3. is not subject to the jurisdiction of the court. 233
Subsection 1 of MSTA's amendment would add a requirement
of expert testimony-and hence cost-that does not exist in the
current statute. Additionally, subsection 3 is arguably unconstitutional as applied in criminal cases. The Constitution requires that
the State make reasonable efforts to obtain the attendance or testimony of a witness, even one who is beyond the court's
jurisdiction. 234
230. See § 775 (c) (2).
231. See MSTA, House BiU 98 - List of MSTA Proposed Amendments 'I 4 Gan. 8, 1997)
(on file with author). See generally H.D. 98, MARYLAND HOUSE JOURNAL 77
(1997) (full text of bill on file with author); supra Part IV.B.2.a.i.
232. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
233. MSTA, supra note 231, 'II 4.
234. See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 721 (1968) (stating that merely being out of
the jurisdiction is insufficient-the State must make a good faith attempt at
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The Deposition Provision

Several bills, including Senate Bill 658 235 in the 1997 session,
have proposed the elimination of the deposition provision. Two
sound rationales support this change: (1) because no justification
has been made to single out this kind of hearsay witness from any
other, and (2) because of the deterrent cost the provision imposes
on the State. To date, no amendments effecting this change have
been adopted.
4.
"Categories" of Walks of Life of Witnesses who Heard Child's
Statement
Probably the most illogical provision of Maryland's tender years
statute is its restrictive list as to the professions that a witness, who
has heard a child's out-of-court statement, must hold, in order for a
court to look at the child's statement and screen it for reliability.
Repeated sessions have seen bills that would have amended this provision, either by modestly expanding the list of professions, or by
simply doing away with the list altogether. In 1998, the Maryland
General Assembly passed an amendment that modestly expanded
and liberalized this provision. 236
a.

Modest Proposals

Numerous proponents have pointed out the illogic of restricting physicians, psychologists, and social workers to such "licensed"
professionals, when, for example, interns practicing in Maryland
and staffing the emergency rooms are often not licensed in Maryland, and jurisdictions such as Baltimore City do not have "licensed" social workers. These limitations frustrate the state's interest in protecting children.237
For example, Delegate Ulysses Currie from Prince George's
County, wrote in a letter to the editor in 1993:
obtaining, through all reasonable means, the presence of a witness who is
outside of the jurisdiction); State v. Breeden, 333 Md. 212, 227 n.5, 634 A.2d
464, 471 n.5 (1993); Cordovi v. State, 63 Md. App. 455, 462-63, 492 A.2d 1328,
1331-32 (1985).
235. S. 658, MARYLAND HOUSE JOURNAL 173940 (1997) (full text of bill on file with
author).
236. See infra note 246 and accompanying text; supra note 11 and accompanying
text. Section 775, with amendments, is contained in the Appendix to this Article.
237. See, e.g., Jessica Collins, Statement to the Maryland House of Delegates, Judiciary Committee (1993) (on file with author).
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During the 1992 session of the General Assembly, the
state Department of Human Resources pushed for passage
of legislation to allow unlicensed social workers to present
such testimony. Unlicensed social workers make up almost
one-third of the state's child protective services staff.-170
out of 550 workers- because the agency cannot afford a
100 percent licensed staff. The legislation was killed.
In the 1993 legislative session, the department again
pushed for legislation to expand the list of professionals
who can give child-abuse hearsay testimony to include any
professional employee of any correctional, educational,
health, juvenile services or social services agency, institution
or licensed facility. This would add to the list counselors,
unlicensed social workers, case workers, probation and parole and police officers, etc. The bill won Senate approval
but failed by one vote in the House Judiciary Committee.
I find it impossible to understand why such a law does
not have unanimous support. Charles A. Chiapparelli, chief
of the Child Abuse Division of Baltimore's State's Attorney's
Office, says he has seen case after case in which accused
child abusers go free because statements from unlicensed
social workers could not be used.
The law now stacks the odds against the child victim. If
a child discloses an incident of abuse to a policeman, emergency room nurse or any other of the many professionals
legally prohibited from presenting hearsay testimony, the
case folds, and the abuser goes free.
It also should be noted that the current law defies
logic. On one hand, it requires all "health practitioners" to
report suspected child abuse; on the other hand, it allows
only licensed physicians and psychologists to testify. 238
In 1993, Senate Bill 498,239 and again in 1994, Senate Bill 34()240
proposed to add the following "categories" of potential witnesses:

238. Ulysses Currie, Stacking the Odds Against Abused Children, THE WASH. POST, June
6, 1993, at 8. See generally MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-704 (Supp. 1997) (requiring "each health practitioner, police officer, or educator or human service
worker" to report suspected child abuse).
239. S. 498, MARYLAND SENATE JOURNAL 430 (1993).
240. S. 340, 1994 Md. Laws ch. 169 (containing bill as enacted and deleted provisions).
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5. An intern or resident acting under the supervIsion of a
licensed physician or working in an accredited hospital; 6. A
registered nurse, as defined under § 8-101 of the health occupations article;
7. A physician assistant, as defined under § 15-101 of the
health occupations article;
8. A school psychologist certified by the state department of
education; or
9. A certified professional counselor, as defined under § 17101 of the health occupations article .... 241
These proposals died in the House Judiciary Committee. 242
In 1996, Carolyn H. Lingeman, M.D. explained the practicality
of expanding the list through written testimony to the House Judiciary Committee:
I believe that admissible testimony regarding out of
court statements in child abuse cases should not be limited
to the four categories of licensed professionals specified in
the current law. Among those whose testimony should also
be accepted are nurses, police detectives, members of the
clergy, and other trusted individuals to whom a child may
confide the details of abuse. Decisions about the credibility
of the witnesses should be the responsibility of the
Court. . . . Sometimes it is a police detective who is investigating after the mandatory reporting of suspected abuse
who is able to elicit the details from the child, or it may be
a school counselor who is not a licensed teacher, or other
trusted individual who is in a position to assist the
child. . . . It would be in the best interests of abused children if the qualifications of the witness and the reliability of
the testimony are left to the courts to decide.243
Despite the advantages of removing the list, m 1997, only
241. S. 340, sec. 1, § 9-103.l (b) (2) (i) (5) (deleted from enacted bill); S. 498 amend.
3.
242. See generally S. 340 (enacted bill).
243. Carolyn H. Lingeman, M.D., Statement to the Maryland House of Delegates
Judiciary Committee (Aug. 6, 1996) (on file with author).
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House Bill 34244 passed in the House; that bill would only have added nurses to the list and removed the licensing requirement as to
all listed professionals. 245 In the 1998 legislative session, the Maryland General Assembly passed an amendment to the tender years
statute, effective October 1, 1998, which repeals the "licensed" requirement and extended the list of professionals. 246

b.

Abrogate the List: The Only Sensible Solution

In 1997, Senate Bills 132247 and 658 248 and House Bills 648 249
and 98250 would have simply removed the list altogether. These bills
also died in the House Judiciary Committee. Although the Senate
passed Senate Bill 658, no compromise was reached in conference;
there was no conference committee report, nor were any amendments prepared by the Amendment Office for the Conference
Committee.
Mere piecemeal adding to the list of categories of professions
ensures only one thing: this statute will be before the General P&
sembly each year, because there is no logical reason to include one
profession and not another. If psychologists and teachers are included, why not school counselors? If physicians are included, why
not dentists? If teachers are included, why not coaches? Why not
Girl Scout leaders? The why nots could go on ad infinitum.
The requirement of particular professions is unnecessary, because the statute already requires the trial judge to screen out insufficiently reliable statements. 251 Moreover, the strictures of the list
244. H.D. 34, MARYLAND HOUSE JOURNAL 41 (i997) (full text of bill on file with author).
245. See H.D. 34 amend. 2. Senate Bill 376 would have added only "licensed, registered nurses" to the list of possible fact witnesses. S. 376 (Md. 1997) (on file
with author).
246. See H.D. 590, sec. 1, § 775(b)(2)(i) (Md. 1988) (effective October 1, 1998),
available in <http://mlis.state.md.us/1998rs/billfile/HB0590.htm> (visited
April 20, 1998); see also supra note 11 and accompanying text. Section 777,
with amendments, is reprinted in the Appendix to this Article.
247. S. 132 (Md. 1997) (on file with author).
248. S. 658, MARYLAND HOUSE JOURNAL 1739 (1997) (full text of bill on file with author) .
249. H.D. 648 (Md. 1997) (on file with author).
250. H.D. 98, MARYLAND HOUSE JOURNAL 77 (1997) (full text of bill on file with author) .
251. See generally MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 775(d) (Supp. 1997) (amended 1998)
(listing factors the court must consider when determining if the tender years
hearsay possesses "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness").
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have unnecessarily caused injustices in cases involving child abuse. 252
Thus, the only sensible solution is to abrogate the list.
V. STRIDENT ASSERTIONS THAT RECUR IN THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY
When this writer testified in support of the tender years exception and listened to the opponents' comments-whether criminal
defense lawyers, MSTA's lawyers, or opponents on the House Judiciary Committee itself-she heard several inflammatory themes
repeated.
A number of the opponents of the current tender years exception, or of any liberalizing amendment, have stated or implied the
following: (1) the tender years exception is unconstitutional as it violates the Confrontation Clause; (2) children lie; (3) wives, who are
"out to get" their husbands, make false accusations of sexual child
abuse in virtually every child custody case and cannot be trusted to
tell the truth; and, (4) teachers, in particular, will be sent to jail on
the basis of false allegations. This section will respond to these assertions, as well as to other arguments that have been made.

A. Does the Current "Tender Years" Hearsay Exception Violate an Accused s Confrontation Right? Would Doing Away With the Limiting List of
"Categories" of Witnesses Violate an Accused's Right to Confrontation?
Maryland's tender years statute specifically incorporates the test
that the Supreme Court reaffirmed in Idaho v. Wright,253 thus, the
tender years statute does not violate the Confrontation Clause. In
Wright, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that, as to non-firmly rooted
hearsay exceptions, the mandates of the Confrontation Clause may
be met on a case-by-case basis by a showing that the circumstances
surrounding the making of the statement provide "adequate 'indicia of reliability . . .'" or "particularized guarantees of
252. See generally, e.g., supra notes 12-15, 90 and accompanying text (detailing case
where tender years hearsay was excluded because the statements were made to
a police officer).
253. 497 U.S. 805 (1990). Compare id. at 815 (reaffirming that hearsay that does not
fall within firmly rooted exceptions to the rule against hearsay does not violate
the Confrontation Clause if the hearsay bears " 'particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness'" (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980»), with
§ 775(b)(3), (d) (allowing admission of tender years hearsay "only if the statement possesses particularized guarantees of trustworthiness," and listing specific considerations for the court when making this determination).
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trustworthiness. "254
Likewise, the proposed statute advocated in this Article is constitutional. 255 It would merely permit judges to look at a child's outof-court statement, no matter who the statement was made to, and
evaluate it under that test, considering to whom it was made as part
of the relevant circumstances. 256 Supreme Court precedent in no
way requires a restrictive category.
Maryland's exception goes beyond the Supreme Court's requirement by providing the following additional safeguards for an
alleged abuser: the defense is given twenty days' notice regarding
the statement that the proponent intends to offer;257 the court's
hearing on the· reliability of the evidence must be conducted
outside the presence of the jury and, in the court's discretion,
before the seating of a jury;258 the defendant and the defendant's
lawyer have the right to be present at this hearing;259 if the child is
physically available, the court must conduct an in camera examination of the child before ruling on the admissibility of the evidence;260 the defendant's lawyer has the right to be present at this
examination,261 but not to question the child;262 if the court finds
sufficient indicia of reliability, it must so rule, on the record, stating
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Wright, 497 u.s. at 815 (quoting Rnberts, 448 U.S. at 65).
See infra Part VII.
See infra Part VII.
See § 775(c)(3).
See id. § 775(f).
See id. § 775(f) (2).
See id. § 775(f) (1).
See id. § 775 (f) (2)(ii).
See Bayne v. State, 98 Md. App. 149, 161-63, 632 A.2d 476, 482-83 (1993) (finding that the lower court properly restricted defense counsel's questioning of
the victim at the competency hearing); see also Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S.
730, 733 (1987) (excluding a criminal defendant, but not his counsel, from an
in-chambers hearing held to determine the competency of two child witnesses
did not violate the defendant's confrontation right or his right to due process
because his exclusion did not interfere with his opportunity for effective crossexamination; additionally, after each child testified on direct examination, defense counsel could have asked the judge to reconsider the earlier ruling that
the child was competent); if. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 837-38 (1990)
(holding that a court does not have to observe the child in the presence of
the defendant in order to find that the child cannot effectively communicate
in the defendant's presence; such a requirement would inflict the very trauma
the c1osed-circuit statute was intended to prevent); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 774 (1996) (amended after Craig on remand, 322 Md. 418, 588 A.2d 328
(1991».
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its reasons. 263 If all the preceding conditions are met, the statement
will be admissible if the child testifies at the trial. 264 If the child does
not testifY, the statement will be inadmissible unless there is corroborative evidence that the defendant had the opportunity to commit
the alleged abuse. 265
If the statement is admitted into evidence, the witness testifYing
to the statement may be impeached, including by showing bias. 266
The child declarant may also be impeached, regardless whether the
child testifies or not. 267
B. Are There Many More False Allegations of Child Abuse Made in Divorce Cases Than True, or Reasonably Based, Allegations? Are Hordes of
Mothers Maliciously Accusing Fathers?
First, the empirical evidence does not bear out the anecdotal,
gender-biased assertion that mothers are rampantly falsely accusing
fathers of child sexual abuse in order to gain the upper hand in divorce cases. An important study done by the American Bar Association (ABA), in conjunction with the National Legal Research
Center for Child Advocacy and Protection and the Association of
Family in Conciliatory Courts, found that only 2% (169 cases) of
the 9,000 divorce cases studied involved allegations of sexual
abuse. 268 Of those cases, Child Protective Services found only eight
cases where allegations were malicious in nature. 269 Accusations of
sexual abuse were made not only by mothers (67%), but also by fathers (28%) and third parties (11%).270 Fewer than half of these
cases involved accusations against fathers by mothers 271 -less than
1% of the 9,000 cases studied.
Secondly, there are obvious, legitimate reasons why good faith
allegations would be· made during custody battles. The American
Prosecutors Research Institute reports as follows:
Even when allegations are made, criminal charges are rare
in the face of widespread and misplaced cynicism about
See § 775(e) (1).
See MD. ANN CODE art. 27, § 775(b).
See id. § 775(c)(2).
See MD. RULE 5-616.
See id. 5-806.
See Kathleen Coulbom Faller et aI., Research on False Allegations of Sexual Abuse
in Divorce, 6 APSAC ADVISOR, Fall 1993, at 1, 3.
269. See id.
270. See id.
271. See id.

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
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their validity. Allegations legitimately occur during this time
because: (1) discovery of abuse precipitated the divorce; (2)
separation creates opportunities and sometimes incentives
for abuse; (3) child victims may disclose only when divorce
is pending and the abuser is no longer in the home to enforce silence; (4) the prospect of sole visits with the abuser
may prompt disclosure; and (5) the nonoffending parent
may be more likely to finally believe the child. Many times,
a child has attempted to disclose previously but has been ignored, rejected or misunderstood. 272
In fact, there is evidence that mothers are initially reluctant to
believe that their children's fathers have committed abuse.273 Ironically, when mothers come to this conclusion and make such allegations, the courts tend overwhelmingly to find against them and to
punish them for having accused the fathers.274 In her testimony at
the United States Senate Hearing on the federal Child Victims' Bill
of Rights Bill, Dr. Muriel Sugarman testified that cases of sexual
child abuse are frequently mishandled by divorce courts:
I have been directly involved in evaluation and/or
treatment of about 21 children who were alleged to have
been sexually abused during visitation following parental
separation or divorce. Almost all of these allegations in~
volved children under age six.
I am aware of a significant number of similar cases in
Massachusetts and throughout the country. The magnitude
of this problem is alarming. The management of these
cases by the divorce courts has been inconsistent and uninformed at best; damaging and punitive to children and. the
nonabusive parent at worst.
. . . [T] he subject of child sexual abuse stirs in all of us
painful, uncomfortable, difficult, and sometimes overwhelming feelings. The first response of those without direct experience of this topic is horror and disbelief. Yet statistics
show that there is a veritable epidemic of sexual abuse.
Many adults are skeptical of children's disclosures.
They, and the nonabusing adults to whom they disclose the
272.
.
273.
274.

Reporting Child Maltreatment, American Prosecutors Research Institute, attachment 15 (statement on file with author).
See id.
See id.
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abuse, are often disbelieved. This is particularly true when
the allegations arise at the time of parental separation or
divorce, when custody and visitation issues are being decided. In part, this is because it is far easier to believe that
a child or a reporting parent lied than to believe that an
apparently normal adult committed the abusive behaviors
disclosed.
A number of allegations of sexual abuse cannot be validated or substantiated for a variety of reasons. These unfounded allegations are often called "false." Many experts
feel that few allegations are deliberately false. Allegations
made out of vindictiveness or manipulativeness probably occur in no more than about 5 to 14 percent of cases. Most
allegations are made in good faith, and the majority of
them are true.
The responses of divorce courts to allegations of abuse
have been far different from the responses of the courts
which deal with child protective issues in intact families. In
working intensively with many of these cases, certain distinct
and troubling patterns have emerged in the responses of
the protective agencies and the judicial system.
Twenty children, including four pairs of siblings, were
alleged to have been sexually abused by their biological fathers during paternal visitation after parent separation or
divorce.
There was only one deliberately false allegation of child
sexual abuse by a father, and in that case the child had
been sexually abused by a friend of the father during a paternal visit.
In the 19 validated cases of paternal sexual abuse occurring during visitation, the average age at evaluation was
4 years, 1.5 months. The average age of disclosure was
about 3 years, 8.5 months. The average age when the abuse
apparently actually began was 2 years, 10.5 months. All but
one child were under age 5 when the abuse began.
Sixty-three percent of the abused children were female;
37 percent were male. In 71.4 percent of families in which
there was more than one child, one or more siblings had
also been sexually abused by the father.
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Only one father was indicted and prosecuted 2 years after the first allegations were made. He was acquitted. None
of the other fathers were prosecuted.
In 73.7 percent of the cases, the divorce court system
did not believe the allegations. The conclusions of evaluators without proper qualifications who found no evidence
of sexual abuse were accepted over those of qualified evaluators. About 58 percent of the children were inadequately
protected from further sexual abuse, from intimidation and
harassment by the perpetrator, and from fear of retaliation.
Protective agency supervisors failed to be physically
present at all times during visitation. The court or protective agency sometimes arranged supervision by parents, siblings, friends, or coworkers of the alleged perpetrator who
sometimes left the child alone with the father.
Over half the children were forced against their will to
have frequent, prolonged, and poorly supervised contact
with the alleged perpetrator, regardless of the degree of
traumatization of the child.
Mothers were threatened with loss of custody, contempt of court, and jail if they refused to comply with these
visitation orders.
Significantly, 53.3 percent of the mothers actually had
great initial difficulty believing that their husband had
abused his own child or children.
The following recommendations refer more specifically
to allegations of sexual abuse after parental separation or
divorce. The most important safeguards for the child's wellbeing are to protect the child from the possibility of further
abuse; to protect the child from intimidation, retaliation,
and pressure to recant; to protect the child from repeated
questioning and evaluation and from repeated physical examinations for sexual abuse; to provide in a situation where
contact between the child and the alleged perpetrator may
be in the best interests of the child, for appropriate adult
supervision of visitation by an objective individual with
knowledge of child sexual abuse and clear understanding of
the child's need for protection from abuse and
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intimidation. 275
To assist the courts m evaluating allegations of child sexual
abuse in custody battles, the National Judicial Education Program,
working with the ABA Center on Children and the Law, recently
published a model judicial education curriculum. 276 One of the
most important points made in the training materials is that it is imperative to distinguish between a person who makes a good faith,
but mistaken or insufficiently proven, allegation from one who deliberately fabricates an allegation. 277 A parent who reasonably believes that someone has abused his or her child has a moral and legal duty to act to protect the child and ought not be punished.
C. Are There Many Successful False Claims, Particularly Against Teachers,
as to Abuse of Children Under the Age of 12?

The studies of which this writer is aware do not show that there
is an avalanche of false or unfounded claims of abuse.278 The media's reporting of a few sensational cases, such as the McMartin case
in California,279 overshadows its reporting of the more mundane,
day-to-day cases of abuse, which tend to be reported in general, less
sensational articles; for every McMartin, there are thousands of child
abuse cases. 280
275. Child Victims' Bill of Rights: Hearings on S.B. 761 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, lOlst Congo 109-11 (1989) (statement of Dr. Muriel Sugarman, Child
Psychiatrist) .
276. See Lynn H. Schafran, Adjudicating Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse When Custody
is in Dispute, 81 JUDICATURE 30 (Jul.-Aug. 1997).
277. See id. at 32-33.
278. "A review of five studies concluded that fabricated reports occurred in 4% to
8% of all reports." David Finkelhor, Current Information on the Scope and Nature
of Child Sexual Abuse, 4 THE fuTURE OF CHILDREN 31, 43 (Summer/Fall 1994).
Of these, the fabricated reports are "more likely to originate from adolescents." Id; see also Serrato, supra note 47, at 162 (citing to studies and cases indicating that only a small percentage of abuse victims fabricate).
279. See Lois Timnick, Charges Against Buckey Dismissed--McMartin Case: After Seven
Years and Two Trials, All Molestation Counts are Dropped, LA TiMES, Aug. 2, 1990,
at 1; Dawn Webber, McMartin Jury Says 'Not Guilty' 52 Times-Mistrial Declared
on 13 Counts, LA DAILY NEWS, Jan. 19, 1990, at Nl.
280. See, e.g., Sexually Abused Teen-agers Face Tougher Rnad, THE SUN (BALT.), Oct. 1,
1997, at AS (discussing the fact that sexual abuse often leads to a difficult
life); Youth Offenders Sent Away, Only to Return, THE SUN (BALT.), Sept. 29, 1997,
at Al (discussing problems with rehabilitating violent sex offenders); Powder,
supra note 12, at B6 (reporting on the acquittal of a man who allegedly gave
his five-year-old stepdaughter gonorrhea).
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There do not appear to be many unwarranted convictions, long
prison terms, or big damage awards in sexual abuse cases:
The picture of sexual abuse in the criminal justice system
also suggests overall a tempered rather than hysterical response. As with most crimes, a large number of cases are
dropped before prosecution. One study found that only
42% of serious sexual abuse allegations (that is, those substantiated by child protection authorities and/or reported
to the police) are actually forwarded for prosecution. Moreover, according to statistics from some selected jurisdictions,
arrested sexual offenders against children are somewhat less
likely to be prosecuted than are other violent offenders.
Even when accused sex abusers are convicted, their
sentences are not terribly stiff. Studies suggest that 32% to
46% of convicted child sexual abusers serve no jail time.
Only 19% receive sentences longer than one year . . . .
None of this suggests that the criminal justice system abandons its usual standards of operation when it comes to sexual crimes against children. 281
The chief of the child abuse division of the Baltimore City State's
Attorney's Office has stated that most of the city's prosecutions result in probation rather than prison sentences. 282
MSTA vigorously opposed broadening of the hearsay statute on
the ground that the teachers feared they would be subject to baseless charges. 283 First, the statute under review would have had no effect on the making of out-of-court accusations regarding abuse of
students and the stigma that such accusations may cause. Rules of
evidence simply have no effect on the making of accusations. In addition, the Maryland General Assembly has given teachers special
protection: the State's Attorney must review and investigate charges
of child abuse made against teachers before those charges can be
filed in the district court. 284
Moreover, relatively few complaints have been made against
Maryland teachers. For example, in a total of sixty-one schools in

128 1.

Finkelhor, supra note 278, at 45 (footnotes omitted).
282. Telephone Interview with Julie Drake, Esq. (Dec. 11, 1997).
283. See generally text accompanying supra note 233 (quoting amendments to the
tender years statute submitted by MSTA).
284. See MD. CODE ANN .. CIs. & JUD. PROC. § 2-608(b), (c) (Supp. 1997).
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Anne Arundel County, over the sixteen-year-period from 1977 to
1993, a total of only seventy-five complaints of alleged physical or
sexual child abuse were reported to either Protective Services or the
police. 285 Sixty-three more were investigated only within the school
system. 286 Of the total of 138 allegations in over sixteen years, it is
unknown how many were as to children under twelve, the group affected by the hearsay statute. However, only twenty-three of the
schools were elementary schools; nine more were special schools;
twenty-nine were middle, junior, and senior high schools. 287 In Howard County, which has 39,000 students and 2,770 teachers, there
were only fifteen complaints against teachers between 1995 and
1996. 288 Only four of these cases were prosecuted, three of which involved children under twelve. 289
Furthermore, most child abuse-physical, sexual, and emotional 290-is intra-household and intra-familiaP91 To unduly hamper
285. See Special Counse~ Anne Arundel County Dept. of Educ. Final Report (Dec. 15,
1993).
286. See id.
287. See id.
288. See Report of Child Abuse in Howard County (Oct. 6, 1997) (on file with author).
289. See id.
290. A striking example of emotional abuse was described in convicted murderer
John Thanos's sentencing proceeding:
His father was a sadist who had been treated for mental illness at the
Perry Point veterans hospital in Harford County, according to testimony, and beat Freddie Uohn] regularly from an early age; once
punching him in the scrotum.
But the worst abuse may have been mental. When his wife was
working, the social worker testified, the elder Thanos would turn the
power off in the house, then whisper eerily through the heating
vents that he was the devil and that he was coming after Freddie.
At night, according to the testimony, the elder Thanos would
put sleeping pills in his wife's coffee so that he could have sex with
his oldest daughter. The incest w:ould take place in the same bedroom where Freddie slept, often in the same bed, with only a blanket
separating them, the social worker said.
As Freddie got older, his father increasingly kept the boy away
from the house, sometimes locking Freddie out so that the elder
Thanos could have sex with his daughter, the social worker testified,
adding that Mrs. Thanos knew little about what was going on or
could do little to stop it if she did know.
Typically, psychologists say, Thanos denies all this and lionizes
his father, who died in 1982.
By age 12, Freddie was in trouble. He acted out in school and
was expelled for exploding a homemade bomb on school property.
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the protection of vulnerable children because of the unsubstantiated fear of a group of adults-teachers-sets social policy on its
head. An adult who is erroneously accused is in a far superior position to protect himself than is a child under twelve who is being
abused.

D. Are Children Really Significantly Less Reliable Than Adults "When
They Make Abuse Accusations?
As for whether children lie, the answer is that they may lie, but
adults also may lie. 292 To exclude testimony on the basis that someone may lie would be to exclude all testimony. The way that we deal
with lying witnesses or lying hearsay declarants is to impeach them,
either through cross-examination if they testify or, if they do not
testify, via Maryland Rule 5-806.
The cornerstone of our judicial system is to trust the fact finder
to evaluate the credibility of admitted evidence and give it the appropriate weight. No evidence has been presented to support a conclusion that fact finders give undue weight to young children's outof-court statements. In fact, if judges and juries share the same
prejudice against children's truthfulness that some of the outspoken
members of the bar and legislature do, jurors will tend to evaluate
children's statements with heightened scrutiny.
Although those involved in the legal system may have long assumed that children are more susceptible to suggestion than adults
are, this assumption has been challenged by empirical research. 293
Officials called him "ungovernable."
Glenn Small, Thanos: Violent, Venomous - and 'Damaged' 'Sick' Convicted Killer is
Product of Abuse, Lawyer Says, THE SUN (BALT.), Oct. 31, 1993, at B1.
291. See Serrato, supra note 47, at 158; see also, e.g., United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d
1362, 1366 (8th Cir. 1975) (emphasizing the need for parental testimony in
prosecutions for child abuse because of the high incidence of child abuse in
the home).
292. But see supra note 278 and accompanying text.
293. See Dominic J. Fote, Comment, Child Witnesses in Sexual Abuse Criminal Proceedings: Their Capabilities, Special Problems, and Proposals for Reform, 13 PEPP. L. REv.
157, 157-58 (1985). One study found:
[C]hildren and adults ranging in age from 5 to 22 watched the experimenter and a confederate engage in a heated conversation. At
varying intervals, those viewing the argument were asked to narrate
exactly what they had seen, to answer objective questions about the
incident, including a leading question, and to identify the confederate from a photo array.
Id. at 158-59. The author cited other such experiments:
Ninety-six subjects were tested in four groups consisting of
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In any event, the tender years statute directs the court, when
screening children's out-of-court statements for reliability, to look at
whether leading questions were asked that suggested the responses
obtained. 294 If so, this would be one indicium of unreliability.295
E. Why Not Require That the Out-of Court Statement be Audiotaped or
Videotaped?

In Idaho v. Wright,296 the Supreme Court implied that taping is
not mandated by the Constitution. 297 For practical reasons, a taping
requirement would be unwise. Taping equipment costs money and
is not universally available. Taping also implies that we knew what

294.
295.
296.
297.

twenty-four per group. The four groups were comprised of the following subjects, respectively: kindergarten and first graders, third and
fourth graders, seventh and eighth graders, and college students.
They were tested individually in a small room where the confederate
stormed in, argued with the experimenter over the use of the room,
then stormed out. The duration of a subject's exposure to the confederate was fifteen seconds, from a distance of approximately seven
feet. At intervals of ten or thirty minutes, the subjects were evaluated
on free recall, direct questions including one leading question, and
photo identification. Two weeks later, the subjects returned and were
reassessed, this time using a non-leading question.
[d. at 159 n.8.
Results indicated that very young children were as capable as adults in
answering direct questions about the incident. Also, young children scored as
well as adults in identifying from a photo array. Perhaps most surprising was
the data indicating that children were no more easily swayed to answer incorrectly by the use of leading questions thim were adults. One finding did indicate that children were not as capable as adults to freely articulate their version of what occurred. Nonetheless, while the youngest children tended to say
little, what they did say was three times more likely to be accurate than what
the adults said.
The Marin study concluded that the main problem with young witnesses
is not their ability to accurately perceive events, but their ability to accurately
and meaningfully report their perceptions. Given certain external prompts
and cues, however, "the young witness would be expected to perform quite
adequately." In the final analysis, "it would seem, then, that children as young
as five years of age are no less competent or credible as eyewitnesses than are
adults when responding to direct objective questions."
[d. at 159 (citing Marin, Holmes, Guth & Kovac, The Potential of Children as Eyewitnesses, 3 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 295 (1979) (footnotes omitted».
See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 775 (d) (4) (Supp. 1997) (amended 1998). Section
775, with amendments, is reprinted in the Appendix to this Article.
See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
497 U.S. 805 (1990).
See supra Part II.
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the subject of the statement would be beforehand: that is why we
taped it. A taping requirement could lead to the consideration by
the court of only a less spontaneous and less reliable statement than
the statements that preceded the taping. Surely it is nonsensical to
restrict the court from considering the most reliable and most spontaneous statements.
VI. COMPARISON OF MARYLAND'S CURRENT STATUTE TO
SPECIFIC TENDER YEARS EXCEPTIONS OF OTHER STATES
It is useful to compare Maryland's tender years exception to
those of the thirty-eight other states that have specific tender years
exceptions. 298

A.

Constitutionality

The state courts that have ruled on the question have upheld
the constitutionality of their tender years exceptions, except for decisions in Arizona and Mississippi that were based on a finding that
the legislatures had exceeded their powers and trod on the judiciary's power. 299 Subsequently, Mississippi enacted a tender years rule
of court.300

B.

Applicability to which Out-ofCourt Declarants

The Maryland statute applies only to the child victim of certain
crimes, abus<;!, or neglect. 301 At least seven states extend the tender
years exception to child witnesses other than the victim himself. 302
The proposed statute set forth in Part VII of this Article would similarly extend the Maryland statute.
Maryland's exception applies only to statements made by children under twelve years of age. 303 Six states extend the tender years
298. See infra notes 399400.
299. See State v. Robinson, 735 P.2d 801 (Az. 1987); Mitchell v. State, 539 So. 2d
1366 (Miss. 1989).
300. See MISS. R EVID. 803(25).
301. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 775 (b) (1) (Supp. 1997) (amended 1998). Section
775, with amendments, is reprinted in the Appendix to this Article.
302. See ALA. CODE § 15-25-32 (1975); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (West 1989);
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-129 (West 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 3513(a) (1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(22) (West 1979); N.D. R EVID.
803(24); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 19-16-38 (Michie 1995). Rhode Island's and
South Carolina's statutes could also be read to this effect. See RI. GEN. LAws
§ 14-1-69 (1994); S.c. CODE ANN. § 19-1-180 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1997).
303. See § 775(b). Section 775, with amendments, is reprinted in the Appendix to
this Article.
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exception to persons of similar mental development due to retardation, disability, or senility.304 The proposed statute set forth in Part
VII of this Article would similarly extend the Maryland statute.

C.

Availability or Unavailability of Declarant to Testify

Maryland's statute applies "regardless of whether the child testifies. "305 Seven states' exceptions apply if the child is either available
to testify or unavailable. 306 These are exceptions most similar to Maryland's.307 Other states, with only residual exceptions, also would
permit sufficiently reliable hearsay regardless whether the declarant
is available to testify. The proposed statute set forth in Part VII of
this Article retains Maryland's current approach, which is also that
of Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-803.
Nineteen states' provisions apply if the child actually testifies at
the proceeding (or by closed-circuit television) or is unavailable to
testify.308 Six states' exceptions apply only if the child testifies or is
available to testify.309 Six states' provisions apply only if the child is
unavailable to testify. 310
304. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(22) (West 1979); 725 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/11510 (West Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West Supp. 1998); MISS. R
EVID. 803(25); OR. R EVID. 803(18a)(b); VT. R EVID. 804a(a) (including mentally-ill adults).
305. § 775(c).
306. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.96 (West 1994); MISS. R EVID. 803(25); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 516:25-a (Supp. 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2803.1 (West
Supp. 1998); RI. GEN. LAws § 14-1-69 (1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-411
(1995) .
307. See infra Part VII for a discussion of Maryland law.
308. See ALA. CODE § 15-25-32 (1995); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (West 1989);
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-129 (West 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§ 3513(a) (1995); FlA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(22) (West 1979); IDAHO CODE § 193024 (1997); 725 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/115-10 (West Supp. 1997); IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-37-40 (Michie 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West Supp. 1998);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.075 (West 1996); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51.385 (Michie
Supp. 1997); NJ. R. CT. 803(27); N.D. CT. RuL. 803(24); OR. R. CT.
803(18a)(b); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5985.1 (West Supp. 1997); S.c. CODE
ANN. § 19-1-180 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 19-16-38
(Michie 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.13:2 (Michie 1995); WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. § 9A.44.120 (West Supp. 1998).
309. See AIA. CODE § 15-25-32 (1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 803(25) (Michie 1997)
(prior inconsistent statement only); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-16 (1995); MICH. R
EVID. 803A (prior consistent statement only); TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art.
38.072 (West Supp. 1998); VT. R EVID. 804a(a).
310. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1228 (West 1995); HAw. CT. R. 804(6); RAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-460(dd) (Supp. 1997); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205 (West 1997);
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Corroboration Requirement

If the child does not testify at the trial, Maryland requires corroboration of the alleged abuser's opportunity to commit the
abuse. 311 Seventeen states similarly require corroborative evidence
only if the child is unavailable to testify.3I2 Maryland's requirement
is broader, however, because it applies not only if the child is unavailable to testify, but also if the child is available, but does not
testify.313
Seven states specify that the corroboration required is of the
act of abuse or neglect. 314 Oregon requires corroboration of both
the abuse and the alleged abuser's opportunity to commit the
abuse. 315 California's very limited exception only permits the evidence to corroborate an accused's confession and the evidence
must be in the form of a written report of a law enforcement officer or a county welfare employee. 316 Michigan only permits tender
years hearsay evidence if the child testifies consistently with it. 317
The proposed statute set forth in Part VII of this Article retains Maryland's current approach.

311.
312.

313.
314.

315.
316.
317.

MAss GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 233, § 81(b)(West Supp. 1997); OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. EVID. R 807 (Banks-Baldwin 1994).
See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 775 (Supp. 1997) (amended 1998). Section 775,
with amendments, is reprinted in the Appendix to this Article.
See ALA. CODE § 15-25-32 (1995); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (West 1995);
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-129 (West 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(22)
(West 1979); IDAHO CODE § 19-3024 (1997); 725 ILL. CaMP. STAT. ANN. 5/115-10
(West Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West Supp. 1998); MISS. R EVID.
803(25); NJ. R EVID. 803(27); N.D. R EvlD. 803(24); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
EVID. R 807 (Banks-Baldwin 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2803.1 (West
Supp. 1998); OR R EVID. 803(18a)(b) (only required in a criminal trial); 42
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5985.1 (West Supp. 1997); S.c. CODE ANN. § 19-1-180
(Law Co-op. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 19-16-38 (Michie 1995); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5411 (1995); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.44-120 (West Supp. 1998).
See § 775(c) (2).
See NJ. R EVID. 803(27); N.D. R EVID. 803(24); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 2803.1 (West 1993); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5985.1 (West 1982); S.D. CaDI·
FIED LAws § 19-16-38 (Michie 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5411 (1995); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.44-120 (West Supp. 1998).
See OR R EVID. 803(18a) (b).
See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1228 (West 1995).
See MICH. R EVID. 803A.
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Pretrial Notice

Twenty-three states, including Maryland, impose an across-theboard pretrial notice requirement when a child victim's out-of-court
statement is going to be offered into evidence.318 On the other
hand, Nevada requires notice, but only if the child is unavailable to
testify.319 The proposed statute set forth in Part VII of this Article retains Maryland's current approach.
F.

Defense's Ability to Take Deposition

No state, other than Maryland, provides that the defense has
the right to take the deposition of the witness who will testify to the
child's statement. 320 The proposed statute set forth in Part VII of
this Article would abrogate this right.

C.

Limitation as to Who Can Testify to the Child's Statement

Of the thirty-nine states that rely on specific tender years exceptions, as opposed to catch-all provisions, thirty-four do not create a
requirement as to the professions of those to whom the child's
statement has been made, electing instead to provide for a case-bycase determination of the reliability of the statement. 321 Of course,
318. See ALA. CODE § 15-25-35 (1995); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416(B). (West
1989); ARK. R EVID. 803(25); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-129 (West 1997);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3513(d) (1995); FlA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(23)(b)
(West 1979 & Supp. 1998); IDAHO CODE § 19-3024 (1997); 725 ILL. COMPo STAT.
ANN. 5/115-10 (d) (West 1992 & Supp. 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6(e)
(West 1992 & Supp. 1997); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-103.1(3)
(1995); MICH. R EVID. 803A(4); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(3) (c) (West 1988);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.075(3) (West 1996); NJ. R EVID. 803(27)(a); OKlA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 2803.1B (West 1993 & Supp. 1998); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 5985.1(b) (West 1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-1-180(c) (Law Co-op. Supp.
1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 19-16-38 (Michie 1995); TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN.
art. 38.072(2) (b)(l) (A) (West Supp. 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-411 (3)
(Supp. 1995); VT. R EvlD. 804a(a); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.13:2 C (Michie
1995); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.44-120 (West 1988 & Supp. 1998).
319. See NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51.385(2) (1985).
320. See MD. ANN CODE art. 27, § 775 (c) (4) (i) (Supp. 199,7) (amended 1998).
321. See ALA. CODE § 15-25-32 (1995); AIAsKA STAT. § 12.40.110 (Michie 1995); ARIz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (West 1989); ARK. R EVID. 803(25); CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 1228 (West 1995); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-129(3) (West 1997); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3513 (1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-16 (1995); HAw. R
EVID. 804(b) (6); IDAHO CODE § 19-3024 (1997); 725 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/
115-10 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6 (Michie 1994 &
Supp. 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.96 (West Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-460(dd) (1994 & Supp. 1997); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 233, § 81 (West
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those additional states with only general residual hearsay exceptions
do not limit potential witnesses at all.
In addition, five states have sui generis restrictions. California's
statute admits only a written report of a law enforcement officer or
a welfare employee. 322 Iowa's statute creates a narrow tender years
exception that applies to CINA proceedings only.323 The Iowa statute requires that there be either a writing, audiotape, or videotape
made by "a juvenile court officer, a peace officer, or a hospital. "324
Other states create additional artificial restrictions in their statutes. For instance, South Carolina restricts the testimony of a child's
statement only when the statement alleges abuse or neglect by one
of his parents, and the allegation of abuse or neglect is made after
the parents' separation or divorce.325 Even in those cases, the statement is admissible only if it was made by the child "to a law enforcement official, an officer of the court, a licensed family counselor or therapist, a physician or other health care provider, a
teacher, a school counselor, a Department of Social Services staff
member, or to a child care worker in a regulated child care
facility. "326
Texas limits its tender years hearsay witness to the first person,
eighteen years or older, to whom the child made a statement about
the offense. 327 This provision makes the tender years exception
somewhat analogous to Maryland's exception for a prompt report
of rape or sexual assault,328 and permits the first allegation by the

322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.

328.

Supp. 1997); MICH. R EVID. 803A; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(3) (West 1988);
MISS. R EVID. 803(25); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.075 (West 1996); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 51.385 (1985 & Supp. 1997); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 516:25-a (Supp.
1995); NJ. R EVID. 803(27); NY FAM. CT. ACT. § 1046 (McKinney 1983); N.D.
R EVID. 803(24); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. EVID. R 807 (Banks-Baldwin 1995 &
Supp. 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2803.1 (West 1995); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 5985.1 (West 1982 & Supp. 1997); RI. GEN. LAws § 14-1-69 (1994); S.c.
CODE ANN. § 19-1-180 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 19-16-38
(Michie 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5411 (1995); VT. R EvlD. 804a(a); VA.
CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.13:2 (Michie 1995); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.44-120
(West 1988 & Supp. 1998).
See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1228 (West 1995).
See IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.96(6) (West 1996).
[d.
See S.c. CODE ANN. § 19-1-180(G) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1997).
[d.
See TEx. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 38.072(2) (a)(2) (West Supp. 1998). Presumably others could testify to the child's subsequent consistent statements if the
child is impeached by suggestion of fabrication or improper motive.
See MD. RULE 5-802.1 (d).
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child to be admitted into evidence. 329
Focusing on the relationship of the witness to the child, Rhode
Island requires that the statement be "made to someone the child
would normally turn to for sympathy, protection or advice."33o This
provision, of course, is not a restriction on professions. It would
seem to broadly include parents, siblings, friends, law enforcement
officers, health services and social services workers, school personnel, the clergy, and any other person to whom the child may
turn. 331 The proposed statute set forth in Part VII of this Article follows the lead of the thirty-four states that omit the restrictive list.332
It also incorporates the language of the Rhode Island statute as a
factor to be looked at by the court in determining reliability.333
H.

Types of Proceedings That the Exceptions are Applicable to

States that have specific tender years exceptions vary widely as
to which types of proceedings their exception applies. The states
fall within the following eleven categories: (1) any judicial proceeding-Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Mississippi, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oregon, and Vermont (also permitted in administrative proceedings);334 (2) any criminal or civil proceeding-Arizona, Florida, and
Minnesota;335 (3) criminal, juvenile, or civil proceeding-New
Jersey;336 (4) criminal, delinquency, or civil proceedings-Colorado;337 (5) criminal, delinquency, or child protection proceedings-Kansas and Washington;338 (6) criminal or juvenile proceedings-Oklahoma;339 (7) criminal or delinquency proceedingsMichigan;340 (8) criminal proceedings-Alabama, Arkansas, California, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nevada, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, and Utah;341 (9) grand jury hearings-Alaska;342 (10) civil proceedings-New Hampshire and
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.

See TEX. CODE. CRIM. P. ANN. art. 38.072 (West Supp. 1998).
R.I. GEN. LAws § 14-1-69 (1994).
See id.
See supra note 321.
See R.I. GEN. LAws § 14-1-69 (1994).
See infra notes 399-400.
See infra notes 399-400.
See NJ. R EVID. 803(27).
See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-129 (West 1997).
See infra notes 399-400.
.
See infra note 400.
See infra note 399.
See infra notes 399-400.
See ALAsKA STAT. § 12.40.110 (Michie 1985).
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Virginia;343 (11) child protection hearing-Iowa, Michigan, New
York (family court), Rhode Island (custody or termination), and
South Carolina (family court).344 The proposed statute set forth in
Part VII of this Article would make the exception applicable in
criminal, civil, and juvenile proceedings.
/.

Timing of Admissibility Determination

Several states do not specify when and where the trial court
must make the preliminary determination as to admissibility. However, many require an in camera determination. For example, New
Jersey requires a "hearing conducted pursuant to [Evidence] Rule
104(a),"345 which provides that the court "may hear" the matter
outside the presence of the jury.346 Michigan requires a pretrial determination;347 North Dakota requires an in limine hearing;348 and
Oregon requires a determination "immediately prior to the commencement of trial. "349
VII. A PROPOSAL FOR AMENDING MARYlAND'S STATUTE
The following proposed statute is based on Senate Bill 658 350
from the 1997 session. Some changes have been made, and footnotes have been added. The proposed statute would extend the
tender years exception in the following ways: (1) extend the exception to civil proceedings; (2) make the exception applicable to child
witnesses to abuse of other children, such as siblings, when their
out-of-court statements are shown to be reliable; (3) make the exception applicable to older retarded or developmentally disabled
persons who have a mental or developmental age of under 12 and,
therefore, need protection; and (4) omit the list of categories of
professions of witnesses, who can testify.
The proposed statute provides that screening by the judge
could be held, in the court's discretion, before the seating of a jury.
As mandated in Idaho v. Wright,351 the criteria used for determining
the reliability of tender years hearsay are modified to preclude the
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.

See infra note 400.
See infra notes 399400.
NJ. R EVID. 803(27).
Id. 104(a).
See MICH. R EVID. 803A.
See N.D. R EVID. 803(24).
OR R EVID. 803(18a) (b).
S. 658 (Md. 1997) (on file with author).
497 U.S. 805, 806 (1990).
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judge from either considering corroborating evidence or judging
the credibility of the witness testifying to the child's statement; instead, these issues are properly left to the trier of fact. Moreover,
the criterion included in the Rhode Island statute regarding persons from whom the child likely would seek solace, protection, or
advice,352 is added as an indicium of reliability.
A BILL ENTITLED353
AN ACT concerning
Child Abuse - Out of Court Statements

FOR the purpose of expanding a provision of law that allows
certain out-of-court statements concerning alleged offenses against
certain child victims to be admitted in certain court proceedings by
allowing these statements to be offered in" civil proceedings if found
to be sufficiently reliable; and generally relating to the use of certain out of court statements concerning certain offenses in court
proceedings.
BY repealing Article 27 - Crimes and Punishments Section 775
Annotated Code of Maryland (1996 Replacement Volume) and reenacting it with amendments, as Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article Section 9-103.1
SECTION 1. BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
OF MARYLAND, That the Laws of Maryland read as follows:
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article Section 9-103.1
(a) In this section "statement" means:
(1) An oral or written assertion; or
(2) Nonverbal conduct, if it is intended as an assertion, including sounds, gestures, demonstrations, drawings, or similar
actions. 354
(b) (1) Subject to the provisions of [paragraphs (2) and (3)] PARAGRAPH (2) of this subsection, if a court finds that the requirements
of subsection (c) of this section are satisfied, a court may admit into
evidence in a juvenile [court proceeding], CML, or [in a] criminal
352. See supra notes 330-31 and accompanying text.
353. Language deleted from the statute currently in force, including amendments
effective October I, 1998, see supra notes II, 246 and accompanying text, are
placed in [brackets], and added language is CAPITALIZED.
354. This definition could be removed and replaced with a cross-reference to Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-801 (a). However, having the explanation in subsection (a) (2) may be helpful to the courts.

o
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court proceeding an out-of-court statement, to prove the truth of
the matter asserted in the statement, made by a child [victim]355
WHEN356 under the age of twelve 357 years, who is EITHER the alleged victim or the child alleged to need assistance in the case
before the court, concerning an alleged offense against the child,
OR A WITNESS TO SUCH AN OFFENSE AGAINST ANOTHER
CHILD,358 of:
(i) Child abuse OR ABUSE OF A VULNERABLE ADULT,359
as defined in ARTICLE 27, Sections 35C and 35D [of this
article] ;
(ii) Rape or sexual offense, as defined in ARTICLE 27, Sections 462 through 464B [of this article];
(iii)Attempted rape or attempted sexual offense in the first
or second degree, as defined in ARTICLE 27, Section 464F
[of this article]; or
(iv) In a juvenile OR CIVIL court proceeding, abuse or
neglect as defined in Section 5-701 of the Family Law
Article. 360
(2) FOR PURPOSES OF THIS SECTION, A "CHILD" SHALL INCLUDE A PERSON WHO IS CHRONOLOGICALLY TWELVE
YEARS OR OLDER, BUT HAS A MENTAL OR DEVELOPMENTAL
AGE OF UNDER TWELVE, BECAUSE OF MENTAL RETARDATION OR DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITY, AS DEFINED IN Maryland Annotated Code, Health-General I Sections 7-101 (1) and 7101 (e).361
355. This proposed statute extends the exception to child witnesses of abuse or
negligence of other children, e.g., their siblings.
356. This is intended to clarifY that the child must be under twelve when the outof-court statement was made; the child does not necessarily have to be under
twelve at the time of trial.
357. This proposed statute does not attempt to change the cut-ofI age of twelve or
older. However, other states vary widely on this policy question.
358. See supra note 302 and accompanying text (proposing that the exception also
extends to child witnesses of alleged child abuse).
359. See supra note 304 and accompanying text (extending the exception to vulnerable adults).
360. This proposed statute does not address whether the events to which the
child's statement pertains should be broadened, e.g., to include all crimes. See
Andrea J. Sedlak, Ph.D. & Diane D. Braodhurst, M.L.A., Executive Summary of
the Third National Incidence Study of Child Abuse and Neglect, at 18-21 (Sept.
1996) (report on file with author).
361. See supra note 304 and accompanying text (proposing that the exception also
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[(2) An out
only if:
(i) The
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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of court statement may be admissible under this section

statement was made to and is offered by:
A physician;
A psychologist;
A nurse;
A social worker;
A principal, vice principal, teacher, or school counselor
at a public or private preschool, elementary school, or
secondary school; and
(ii) The individual described under item (i) of this paragraph
was lawfully acting in the course of the individual's profession
when the statement was made.J362
(2) An out-of-court statement may be admissible under this section
only if [the statement possesses particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness.] 363
THE COURT FINDS, IN A HEARING CONDUCTED OUTSIDE
THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY OR, IN THE COURT'S DISCRETION, BEFORE THE SEATING OF A JURY,364 THAT THE TIME,
CONTENT, AND CIRCUMSTANCES SUPPORTING THE MAKING
OF THE STATEMENT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT INDICIA OF RELIABILITY TO PERMIT ITS ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE.365 THE
COURT SHALL MAKE A FINDING ON THE RECORD AS TO
THE SPECIFIC INDICIA OF RELIABILITY, SET FORTH IN SUBSECTION (D), THAT ARE PRESENT OR ABSENT IN THE
STATEMENT. 366
(c) (I)Under this section, an out-of-court statement by a child
may come into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement[:
(i) If the child's statement is not admissible under any
other hearsay exception;367 and
extends to vulnerable adults).
362. See supra note 321.
363. In the proposed amendment, the list of categories is removed.
364. For clarity, section (e) of the current statute is moved here and specific language is added, granting flexibility and direction to the trial judge regarding
whether the determination mayor must be made prior to jury selection. But
see infra part VIII.
365. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 815-17 (1990).
366. By creating a record of the judge'S determination, this section facilitates appellate·review.
367. This provision is omitted because of the adoption of the Maryland Rules of Evi-
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(ii) Regardless] REGARDLESS of whether the child
testifies.
(2) If the child does not testifY, the child's out of court statement will be admissible only if there is corroborative evidence
that:
(i) The defendant in a criminal proceeding had the opportunity to commit the alleged offense; or
(ii) The alleged offender in a juvenile court OR CIVIL
proceeding had the opportunity to commit the alleged
abuse or neglect. 368
(3) In order to provide [the defendant withJ369 an opportunity
to prepare a response to the statement, the [prosecutor] PROPONENT OF THE EVIDENCE shall serve on the [defendant,]
ADVERSE PARTY in a criminal proceeding or [on the alleged
offender] in a juvenile370 court proceeding [and the alleged offender's attorney], a reasonable time before the juvenile court
proceeding and at least twenty days before the criminal proceeding in which the statement is to be offered into evidence,
notice of:
(i) The [State's] PROPONENT'S intention to introduce
the statement; and
(ii) The content of the statement.
UNLESS PROVIDED OTHERWISE BY PRETRIAL ORDER, THE
SAME NOTICE AND SERVICE DESCRIBED IN THIS SUBSECTION SHALL BE PROVIDED, AT LEAST TWENTY DAYS BEFORE
TRIAL, TO ALL PARTIES IN A CIVIL PROCEEDING.371

368.

369.
370.
371.

dence. If the provision was retained, the court would have to decide that the
evidence was inadmissible under the residual exceptions before it could consider the statutory exception-an illogical manner of proceeding, to say the
least.
This proposed statute retains subsection (c) (2), which adds a second condition to admissibility when the child does not testifY, even though the statement must have been found to be reliable by the judge after consideration of
the factors in subsection (d). MSTA proposed to omit subsection (c)(2), but
not subsection (d)(lO), see MSTA, supra note 231, 1: 5, perhaps because they
misread Idaho v. Wright. Realistically, a reasonable prosecutor would not proceed without the evidence required by subsection (c) (2).
The abuser may not be the defendant. However, the abuser could be a juvenile offender, a CINA, or an employee of the defendant.
This change is made in recognition of the fact that the accused may wish to
offer an out-of-court statement of the child into evidence.
The notice requirement is extended to civil proceedings; nonetheless, the
abuser might not be a party.
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[(4) (i) The alleged offender shall have the right to take the
deposition of a witness who will testify under this section;
(ii) Unless the State and the defendant or respondent
agree, or the court orders otherwise, the defendant in a
criminal proceeding shall file a notice of deposition at
least five days before, or in a juvenile court proceeding
within a reasonable time before, the date of the deposition; and
(iii) Except where inconsistent with this paragraph, the
provisions of Maryland Rule 4-261 shall apply to a deposition taken under this paragraph.]3n
(d) In order to determine if a child's statement possesses [particularized guarantees of trustworthiness] SUFFICIENT INDICIA
OF RELIABILI'J'Y3 73 under this section, the court shall consider
[, but is not limited to,] the following factors: 374
(1) The child's personal knowledge of the event;375
[(2) The certainty that the statement was made;]376
[(3)] (2) Any apparent motive OR LACK OF MOTIVE to
fabricate or exhibit partiality by the child, including interest, bias, corruption, or coercion;
[(4)] (3) Whether the statement was spontaneous [or directly responsive to questions] ;377
[(5)] (4) The timing of the statement;
[(6) Whether] (5) THE CONTENT OF THE STATEMENT, INCLUDING, FOR EXAMPLE,378 WHETHER the
372. The deposition provision is removed because it contravenes the purpose of
the tender years exception. Moreover, prosecutors have suggested that the
deposition provision discourages them from using the tender years exception.
373. This language conforms to the language in Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805
(1990), and is clearer than the language in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66
(1980), which is contained in the current statute.
374. This language is omitted in light of Wright, 497 U.S. at 820-21 (determining
the reliability of the statement by considering the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the making of the statement). See also supra Part II.
375. This should be met by a showing sufficient to support a finding by a jury that
the child had personal knowledge. See MD. RULE 5-602.
376. This factor seems to impermissibly require the court to evaluate the credibility
of the witness testifying to the child's statement. See infra Part VII.D. (criticizing the current statute, which directs the judge to evaluate the credibility of
the witness in child abuse cases as a factor in determining the reliability of the
statement) .
377. The omitted language is superfluous.
378. See Wright, 497 U.S. at 822.

1997]

"Tender Years" War

85

child's young age makes it unlikely that the child
fabricated the statement that represents a graphic, detailed
account beyond [the] AN UNABUSED379 child's knowledge
and experience and the appropriateness of the terminology to the child's age;
[(7)] (6) The nature and duration of the ALLEGED
abuse;
[(8)] (7) The inner consistency and coherence of the
statement;
[(9)] (8) Whether the child was suffering pain or distress
when making the statement;
[( 10) Whether extrinsic evidence exists to show the
defendant's opportunity to commit the act complained of
in the child's statement;380
(11)] (9) Whether the SUBSTANCE OF THE statement [is
suggestive due to] WAS SUGGESTED BY the use of leading questions[;]
(10) WHETHER THE PERSON TO WHOM THE STATEMENT WAS MADE IS ONE TO WHOM THE CHILD
NORMALLY WOULD TURN FOR PROTECTION, SOLACE, OR ADVICE.381
[(12)] (11) The credibility of the person testifying about
the statement].
IN MAKING THIS DETERMINATION, THE COURT SHALL NOT
CONSIDER WHETHER THERE IS INDEPENDENT PROOF OF
THE ALLEGED ACT. 382
[( e) The court, in determining whether a statement is admissible
under this section, in a hearing outside the presence of the jury, or
before the juvenile court proceeding shall:
(1) Make a finding on the record as to the specific guarantees
of trustworthiness that are present in the statement; and
(2) Determine the admissibility of the statement.
(f)] (E)(l) In making a determination under subsection [(e)]
(B) (2) of this section, the court shall conduct an in camera examination of a child prior to determining the admissibility of the statement, except where the child:
379. Added for clarity.
380. The holding in Wright requires removal of this criterion for reliability. See
Wright, 497 U.S. at 824.
381. See supra notes 330-331 and accompanying text.
382. See Wright, 497 U.S. at 824.
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(i) Has died; or
(ii) Is absent from the jurisdiction for good cause shown
or the State OR CIVIL PARTY OFFERING THE EVIDENCE has been unable to procure the child's presence
by subpoena or other reasonable means.
(2)(i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii)2 of this paragraph, any [defendant] PARTY, any [defendant's] PARTYS attorney, and the prosecutor shall have the right to be present
when the court hears testimony on whether to admit into evidence an out-of-court statement of a child under this section.
(ii) If the court is required to observe or question the
child in connection with the determination to admit into
evidence the out-of-court statement:
1. Any defendant's attorney and the prosecutor OR
PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY shall have the right to be present at the in camera examination; and
2. The judge may not permit a defendant OR ALLEGED
ABUSER to be present at the in camera examination. 383
[ (g)] (F) (1) This section may not be construed to limit the admissibility of a statement under any other applicable hearsay exception
or rule of evidence.
(2) This section may not be construed to prohibit the court in
a juvenile court proceeding from hearing testimony in the
judge's chambers.
SECTION 2. AND BE IT FURTHER ENACTED, That this Act shall
take effect October 1, 1999.

A.

lVhy Extend the Exception to Apply to Civil Proceedings?

When present Chief Judge Joseph Murphy and then Chief
Judge Alan Wilner of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland testified before the House Judiciary Committee during the 1996 intersession, they both expressed surprise that Maryland's tender years
statute did "not extend to civil proceedings generally. They stated
that if the evidence is good enough for criminal proceedings, it is
certainly good enough for civil proceedings and that the statute,
therefore, should be broadened.
The tender years exceptions of fifteen other states extend to
383. Added in recognition that there may be cases where a child care facility is being sued for the negligent hiring of a child abuser, so that even though the
defendant may not have abused the child, the alleged abuser will not be permitted at the in camera examination.
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civil proceedings in general. 384 An amendment to this effect would
perhaps enable cases that now are being criminally prosecuted to be
handled more appropriately in noncriminal proceedings, such as
child custody or visitation proceedings or civil proceedings seeking
a protective order. It would also enable the courts to protect children in cases where proof of abuse by the alleged abuser could not
be shown beyond a reasonable doubt, but the preponderance of the
evidence standard was met. In this situation, we have a duty to protect our children when they are in danger.

B. Why Does the Proposed Statute not Require the Proponent of the Hearsay Evidence to Call the Child as a Witness if the Child is Available to
Testify?
The opponents' argument that the child should have to testifY
if available is yet another attempt to treat tender years hearsay as
particularly dangerous. However, there is no justification for mandating young children to take the stand.
As is the case with the more than twenty Maryland Rule 5-803
hearsay exceptions, if a child's out-of-court statement is sufficiently
reliable to be admissible under the tender years hearsay exception,
the party offering the statement ought not be compelled to call the
child to testifY. This decision should be left to trial strategy and the
conscience of the proponent, who may not want to put the child
through the added stress of testifYing. 385
The opposing party has an equal opportunity to examine the
child victim. If the child is available, the opposing party can subpoena the child and examine him just as that party can do with any
available hearsay declarant. Moreover, Maryland Rule 5-607 permits
one to impeach one's own witness. 386 If calling the declarant as
one's own witness is undesirable, that party may ask the court to call
the child as the court's witness, thus allowing both sides to proceed
as if on cross-examination. 387
The Maryland statute has no constitutional infirmity. The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution does not require that
the State produce the child- at trial or prove him or her to be
384. See supra Part VI.H. (Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Vennont, Virginia).
385. See generally Serrato, supra note 47, at 159-60.
386. See MD. RULE 5-607.
387. See id. 5-614.
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unavailable. 388
Moreover, if the child is physically available, the statute requires the court to conduct an in camera examination of the child
before ruling on the admissibility of the child's out-of-court statement. 389 If the child does not testify, the Maryland statute also requires that there be corroborating evidence of the alleged abuser's
opportunity to commit the offense. 390

c. Why Does the Proposed Statute Eliminate the Requirement That the
Trial Court, in Performing its Screening Function, Evaluate the Credibility
of the Person Testifying About the Statement, Including the Court's Certainty
That the Statement was Made?
Another infirmity in the current statute results because it singles out child abuse cases for special scrutiny by directing the trial
judge to evaluate the credibility of the witness who is testifying to
the child's statement. What is relevant to the trial judge's findings
as to the preliminary facts of admissibility of hearsay is the reliability
of the out-of-court declarant, established through the foundation
for each hearsay exception, not the credibility of the in-court witnesses. Motive to lie or bias does not preclude a witness from testifying to admissible hearsay in other situations.
If the husband of a rape victim wishes to testify to his wife's
prompt report of rape, the judge does not look to see if the husband has bias before permitting the husband to testify. Similarly, if
an employee of a business wishes to testify to lay the foundation for
a self-serving business record, the judge does not preclude the employee from testifying on the basis of the witness's bias.
Under the old common law, parties in civil cases, and their
spouses, were incompetent to testify because of their interest in the
outcome. 391 Criminal defendants were incompetent to testify for the
same reason.392 Maryland abrogated that common law rule by statute. 393 Under the current statutory regime, the formerly disqualifying fact may simply be brought out to impeach. 394
388. See supra Part III, B. 2.
389. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 775(f) (Supp. 1997) (amended 1998). Section
775, with amendments; is reprinted in the Appendix to this Article.
390. See § 775(c) (2).
391. See MCCORMICK, supra note 123, § 65-66.
392. 6 MCLAIN, supra note 70, § 607.1.
393. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-101 (1995).
394. See id.
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In directing whether to believe the witness's testimony, the fact
finder will consider, inter alia, a witness's bias. In fact, Maryland
Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions 3: 10 provides:
You are the sole judge of whether a witness should be believed. In making this decision, you may apply your own
common sense and every day experiences.
In determining whether a witness should be believed,
you should carefully judge all the testimony and evidence
and the circumstances under which the witness testified.
You should consider such factors as:
(1) the witness's behavior on the stand and manner of
testifying;
(2) did the witness appear to be telling the truth?
(3) the witness's opportunity to see or hear the things
about which testimony was given;
(4) the accuracy of the witness's memory;
(5) does the witness have a motive not to tell the
truth?
(6) does the witness have an interest in the outcome of
the case?
(7) was the witness's testimony consistent?
(8) was the witness's testimony supported or contradicted by evidence that you believe? and
(9) whether and the extent to which the witness's testimony in the court differed from the statements
made by the witness on any previous occasion.
You need not believe any witness, even if the testimony
is uncontradicted. You may believe all, part or, none of the
testimony of any witness. 395
There is nothing unique in this: it is inherent in the fact finding mission of our judicial system. This is the role of the fact finder:
the jury in a jury trial, the court in a bench trial. As then Chief
Judge Wilner wrote in Kline v. Green Mount Cemetery:396
Courts are constantly called upon to decide, from conflicting evidence, what is fact. That, indeed, is their daily fare.
They have, of course, no firsthand knowledge of what is
fact-who really had the green light, whether it was the
395.

MARYLAND CRIMINAL PATfERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS

§ 1:3 (1993).
396. 110 Md. App. 383,677 A.2d 623 (1996).
CIVIL PATfERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS

§ 3:10 (1995); accard
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defendant who actually shot the victim-but, to perform
their public role as adjudicator, they are empowered to declare, from the evidence presented to them, what is fact,
and, based upon those declarations, whether implicit or explicit, to enter judgments. 397
What is relevant to admissibility is the credibility and apparent
sincerity of the out-of-court declarant-in the case of tender years
hearsay, the child. The child's motive to lie, if any, is relevant to the
trial judge's screening function. If the judge admits the statement, it
may be desirable to give a jury instruction like that set forth in the
Colorado and Arkansas statutes when tender years hearsay has been
admitted:
If a statement is admitted pursuant to this Section the
Court shall instruct the jury that it is for the jury to determine the weight and credit to be given the statement and
that, in making the determination, it shall consider the age
and maturity of the child, the nature of the statement, the
circumstances under which the statement was made, and
any other relevant factors. 398

VIII. ADDITION TO THE RULES OF EVIDENCE
For purposes of predictability, stability, and accessibility, the
tender years hearsay exception should be added to the Maryland
Rules of Evidence in order to guarantee Maryland's children a reasonable opportunity to have their complaints of abuse heard, at least by
a judge who will screen out what the judge finds insufficiently reliable. For purposes of consistency, the tender years hearsay exception
should be included in Maryland Rule 5-803, along with all of the
other hearsay exceptions that apply regardless whether the declarant is available or unavailable to testify.
Although the judicial branch is not immune to the vicissitudes
of voting blocks, it is less vulnerable to lobbying by self-interest
groups than is the legislature. Children do not vote. MSTA members do. Even though teachers are tangential to the big picture of
child abuse, MSTA manages to wield a disproportionate power on
this subject in the Maryland General Assembly. The danger in this
reality is that the child and teacher may, in some instances, have diverging interests.
397. [d. at 387-88, 677 A.2d at 624-25.
398. ARK. R EVID. 803 (25)(A); accord COLO. R

EVID.

803(4).
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A number of other states have placed their tender years excel'
tions in their rules of evidence. Thirty-eight states other than Maryland have specific tender years exceptions. Of these, eight are included in the states' rules of evidence. 399 The remaining thirty states
have statutory tender years exceptions. 4OO Placing the tender years
exception in the rules of evidence makes eminent sense from the
standpoint of accessibility for lawyers and judges.
In a letter to Chief Judge Joseph Murphy, Delegate Vallario
asked. the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
for its input on changes to the tender years statute and relevant policy considerations, including "whether there should be an elimination of the list of persons permitted to testify and whether an elimination of the list should result in any requirement that the child
testify or be found unavailable, as proposed by the Maryland State
Teachers' Association. "401 As of this writing, the committee has
before it a proposal by Chairman Chief Judge Joseph Murphy, al'
proved by the subcommittee on evidence, to amend Maryland Rule
5-803 by adding subsection (25), which would provide:

399. See ARK. R EVID. 803(25); HAw. R EVID. 804(b)(6); MICH. R. EVID. 803A; MISS.
R EVID. 803(25); NJ. R EVID. 803(27); N.D. R EVID. 803(24); OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. EVID. 807 (Banks-Baldwin 1995 & Supp. 1996); VT. R EVID. 804a(a).
400. See ALA. CODE § 15-25-32 (1995); ALAsKA STAT. § 12.40.110 (Michie 1995); ARIz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (West 1989); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1228 (West 1995);
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-129 (West 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3513
(1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(22) (West 1979 & Supp. 1998); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 24-3-16 (1995); IDAHO CODE § 19-3024 (1997); 725 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/
115-10 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6 (Michie 1994 &
Supp. 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.96 (West Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 6Q.460(dd) (1994 & Supp. 1997); MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 9-103.1
(1995); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 233, § 81 (West 1986 & Supp. 1997); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.075 (West 1996); NEV.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 51.385 (Michie 1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 516:25-a (Supp.
1995); NY FAM. CT. ACT § 1046 (McKinney 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 2803.1 (West 1983 & Supp. 1995); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5985.1 (West
Supp. 1997); R.I. GEN. LAws § 14-1-69 (1994); S.c. CODE ANN. § 19-1-180 (Law
Co-op. Supp. 1997); S.D. CODmED LAws § 19-16-38 (Michie 1995); TEX. CODE
CRIM. P. ANN. art. 38.072 (West Supp. 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-411
(1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.13:2 (Michie 1995); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.44-120 (West 1988 & Supp. 1998).
401. Letter from Delegate Joseph F. Vallario, Jr., Chairman of the Maryland House
of Delegates Judiciary Committee, to The Honorable Joseph F. Murphy, Chief
Judge of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals (Aug. 21, 1997) (on file with
author).
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The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even
though the declarant is available as a witness:
(25) Statements Concerning Assaultive Behavior
A statement concerning assaultive behavior to which the declarant was subjected, if the court determines that the time,
content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability. A statement is admissible under
this subsection only if: (A) at the time the statement was
made, the declarant was (i) under the age of 12 years or
(ii) chronologically 12 years or older, but had a mental or
developmental age of under 12, because of mental retardation or developmental disability, as defined in Code,
Health-General Article, §§ 7-101 (1) and 7-101 (e); (B) the
proponent of the statement makes known to the adverse
party, sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to
meet it, the intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant; and (C) the court makes a finding on the records as to
each of the following specific indicia of reliability that are
present or absent:
(i) the declarant's personal knowledge of the event,
(ii) any apparent motive or lack of motive to fabricate
or exhibit partiality by the declarant,
(iii) any apparent motive or lack of motive to fabricate
or exhibit partiality by the witness to whom the statement was made,
(iv)whether the statement was spontaneous,
(v)the timing of the statement,
(vi)the content of the statement,
Committee note: This factor includes, for example, whether
the declarant's young age makes it unlikely that the declarant fabricated the statement that represents a graphic, detailed account beyond an unabused declarant's knowledge
and experience and the appropriateness of the terminology
to the declarant's age.
(vii) the nature and duration of the alleged assaultive
behavior,
(viii) the inner consistency and coherence of the
statement,
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(ix) whether the declarant was suffering pain or distress when making the statement,
(x) whether the substance of the statement was suggested by the use of leading questions, and
(xi) whether the witness to whom the statement was
made is one to whom the declarant normally would
turn for protection, solace, or advice.
Committee note: Subsection (b) (25) of this Rule does not
limit the admission of an offered statement under any other
applicable hearsay exception or law. In this subsection, motive includes interest, bias, corruption, and coercion.
In Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990), a majority of the Supreme Court held that, in determining the admissibility of a
child victim's hearsay statement, the court may not consider
corroborating evidence.

Reporter's Note
The proposed amendments to Rule 5-803 add two categories to the list of types of hearsay that are not excluded by
the hearsay rule even though the declarant is available as a
witness.
The second proposed new subsection is subsection
(b) (25), Statements Concerning Assaultive Behavior, a
"tender years exception" to the hearsay rule, applicable in
both civil and criminal proceedings. Subject to safeguards
to keep unreliable statements out of evidence, subsection
(b) (25) allows admission of a child's out-<>f-court statement
concerning assaultive behavior to which the child was subjected. For a statement to be admissible under this subsection, (1) the statement must have been made by a person
with a chronological or mental age of under 12 years at the
time the statement was made, (2) the proponent of the
statement must have given an advance notice similar to the
advance notice requirement set forth in subsection (b) (24)
of this Rule, and (3) the court must determine that the
time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide
sufficient indicia of reliability and must make a specific
finding on the record as to each indicia of reliability, based
upon the list set out at pp. 43-44 of the October 6, 1997
memorandum of Professor Lynn McLain, with the addition
of subsection (b) (25) (c) (iii), concerning motive or lack of
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motive to fabricate or exhibit partiality by the witness. Also,
with respect to the "tender years exception," the Subcommittee recommends that concurrent legislative changes be
made to Code, Article 27, Section 775.402
Chief Judge Murphy recommended that the legislature make
consistent changes in the statutory evidence law. His proposal
should be embraced by the Standing Committee on Rules and Procedure and forwarded to the Court of Appeals of Maryland.
IX. CONCLUSION
Over ten years of illogically hamstringing Maryland's tender
years hearsay exception is too many. The exception must be broadened so as to permit a trial judge to at least consider a child's reports of physical or sexual abuse, in both civil and criminal cases, so
as to screen and admit the reports if reliable.
Maryland's current restrictions-to criminal and juvenile cases,
to certain occupations of people who can testify to a child's statement, and the sui generis provision that the defense may depose
such witnesses-serve only as artificial, illogical barriers to the protection of children who cannot protect themselves. In order to effectively serve the purpose of the tender years exception, these restrictions must be removed.
The tender years exception must be extended both to other
children who witness the alleged abuse of the child victim and to
vulnerable adults who have the developmental age of young children. Finally, the tender years hearsay exception should be codified
in the Maryland Rules of Evidence, where it will be less vulnerable to
lobbying by such groups as MSTA.

402. Proposed

MD. RULE

5-803(25) (on file with author).
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APPENDIX
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 775 (1997), amended by H.D. 590 (Md.
1998); S. 688 (Md. 1998):403

§ 775. Out of court statements of child abuse victims.
(a) Statement defined. - In this section "statement" means:
(1) An oral or written assertion; or
(2) Nonverbal conduct, if it is intended as an assertion, including sounds, gestures, demonstrations, drawings, or similar
actions.
(b) Admissibility - In general. (1) Subject to the provisions of paragraphs (2) and (3) of this
subsection, if a court finds that the requirements of subsection (c) of this section are satisfied, a court may admit into
evidence in a juvenile court proceeding or in a criminal
proceeding an out of court statement, to prove the truth of
the matter asserted in the statement, made by a child victim under the age of 12 years, who is the alleged victim or
the child alleged to need assistance in the case before the
court, concerning an alleged offense against the child of:
(i) Child abuse, as defined in § 35C of this article;
(ii) Rape or sexual offense, as defined in §§ 462 through
464B of this article;
(iii) Attempted rape or attempted sexual offense in the
first or second degree, as defined in § 464F of this
Article; or
(iv) In a juvenile court proceeding, abuse or neglect as
defined in § 5-701 of the Family Law Article.
(2) An out of court statement may be admissible under this
section only if:
(i) The statement was made to and is offered by:
1. A [licensed] physicianL as defined in § 14-101 of
the Health Occupations Article];
2. A [licensed] psychologistL as defined in § 18-101
of the Health Occupations Article];
3. A nurse;
4. A [licensed] social workerL as defined III § 19101 of the Health Occupations Article];
403. Amendments, which take effect October 1, 1998, are noted as follows: (1) additions are underlined, and (2) deleted provisions are placed in [brackets].
Section 775, as amended, now appears in 1998 Md. Laws ch. 638 and ch. 639.
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[4.] 5. A principal, vice principal, teacher, or school
counselor at a public or private preschool, elementary school, or secondary school; and
(ii) The individual described under item (i) of this paragraph was lawfully acting in the course of the individual's profession when the statement was made.
(3) An out of court statement may be admissible under this
section only if the statement possesses particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.
(c) Same - Conditions precedent. (1) Under this section, an out of court statement by a child
may come into evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted in the statement:
(i) If the child's statement is not admissible under any
other hearsay exception; and
(ii) Regardless of whether the child testifies.
(2) If the child does not testify, the child's out of court statement will be admissible only if there is corroborative evidence that:
(i) The defendant in a criminal proceeding had the opportunity to commit the alleged offense; or
(ii) The alleged offender in a juvenile court proceeding
had the opportunity to commit the alleged abuse or
neglect.
(3) In order to provide the defendant with an opportunity to
prepare a response to the statement, the prosecutor shall
serve on the defendant in a criminal proceeding or on the
alleged offender in a juvenile court proceeding and the alleged offender's attorney, a reasonable time before the juvenile court proceeding and at least 20 days before the
criminal proceeding in which the statement is to be offered into evidence, notice of;
(i) The State's intention to introduce the statement; and
(ii) The content of the statement.
(4) (i) The alleged offender shall have the right to take the
deposition of a witness who will testify under this
section;
(ii) Unless the State and the defendant or respondent
agree, or the court orders otherwise, the defendant
in a criminal proceeding shall file a notice of deposio.
tion at least 5 days before, or in a juvenile court pro-
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ceeding within a reasonable time before, the date of
the deposition; and
(iii) Except where inconsistent with this paragraph, the
provisions of Maryland Rule 4-261 shall apply to a
deposition taken under this paragraph.
(d) Particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. - In order to determine if a child's statement possesses particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness under this section, the court shall consider,
but is not limited to, the following factors:
(1) The child's personal knowledge of the event;
(2) The certainty that the statement was made;
(3) Any apparent motive to fabricate or exhibit partiality by the
child, including interest, bias, corruption, or coercion;
(4) Whether the statement was spontaneous or directly responsive to questions;
(5) The timing of the statement;
(6) Whether the child's young age makes it unlikely that the
child fabricated the statement that represents a graphic,
detailed account beyond the child's knowledge and experience and the appropriateness of the terminology to the
child's age;
(7) The nature and duration of the abuse;
(8) The inner consistency and coherence of the statement;
(9) Whether the child was suffering pain or distress when making the statement;
(10) Whether extrinsic evidence exists to show the defendant's
opportunity to commit the act complained of in the
child's statement;
(11) Whether the statement is suggestive due to the use of
leading questions; and
(12) The credibility of the person testifying about the
statement.
(e) Role of court. - The court, in determining whether a statement
is admissible under this section, in a hearing outside the presence of the jury, or before the juvenile court proceeding shall:
(1) Make a finding on the record as to the specific guarantees
of trustworthiness that are present in the statement; and
(2) Determine the admissibility of the statement.
. (f) In camera examination of child. (1) In making a determination under subsection (e) of this
section, the court shall conduct an in camera examination
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of a child prior to determining the admissibility of the
statement, except where the child:
(i) Has died; or
(ii) Is absent from the jurisdiction for good cause shown
or the State has been unable to procure the child's
presence by subpoena or other reasonable means.
(2) (i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii) of this paragraph, any defendant, any defendant's attorney, and
the prosecutor shall have the right to be present when
the court hears testimony on whether to admit into evidence an out of court statement of a child under this
section.
(ii) If the court is required to observe or question the
child in connection with the determination to admit
into evidence the out of court statement:
1. One attorney for each defendant, one attorney for
the child, and one prosecutor shall have the right
to be present at the in camera examination; and
2. The judge may not permit a defendant to be present at the in camera examination.
(g) Construction of section. (1) This section may not be construed to limit the admissibility
of a statement under any other applicable hearsay exception or rule of evidence.
(2) This section may not be construed to prohibit the court in
a juvenile court proceeding from hearing testimony in the
judge's chambers.

